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Neo-classical theory argues that sustained economic growth depends on an adequacy of 
resources – mainly physical and human capital. The empirical evidence on the sources of 
growth however, does not substantiate this view. Rather, the vast majority of studies show 
that institutional variables, in particular those associated with good economic and 
political governance are central to economic performance and developmental outcomes. 
In Western Europe the necessary favourable institutions emerged through a gradual 
evolutionary process. However, a study of institutional change during the past 100 years 
or so in the non-western world indicates that this is a discontinuous process, with the 
occurrence of favourable developments requiring the intervention of human agency, 
either through an enlightened domestic group or an external force. Using this model of 
institutional change, since 2005 a program of externally supported deep institutional 
interventions has been undertaken in Southern Sudan, an area which has suffered 50 
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A Theory of Discontinuous Change 
 




Mainstream economic theory postulates that the problems of growth and development 
can be solved without reference to the institutional dimension of markets. All that is 
required for the optimum allocation of resources, both in the short and long run, is the 
unfettered operation of the market mechanism. It is assumed that any institution that may 
be required to sustain free contracting amongst agents will emerge spontaneously and 
support the efficient functioning of this system. In this view, epitomized by the Walrasian 
model (Walras [1926] 1954), all societies consist of a mass of individuals who wish to 
trade goods and services for personal betterment. Left to themselves, they have the right 
motivational and behavioural characteristics to participate in an iterative process through 
which market prices are determined, which clear both production and consumption 
markets. The market in such a system is essentially a disembodied institution, which has 
no existence apart from the iterative price making and clearing process that its 
participants go through. Such markets are assumed to emerge spontaneously, be 
ubiquitous, and potentially give the right signals for allocative efficiency to be achieved. 
 
In this neo-classical framework, the adequacy of resources to create both human and 
physical capital, is seen as the key to sustained economic growth. The problem of 
economic development therefore, is not one of the absence of an institutional framework 
or mechanisms to bring about the best use of available resources, but a paucity of the 
resources themselves. A significant consequence of this thinking has been that 
development theory, policy, and practice, over the past 60 years, have tended to 
underplay the role of institutions in economic development. Over the years many 
critiques have been made of the neo-classical model. At a fundamental level the Arrow-
Debreu theorem (Debreu, 1959) by elaborating the stringent formal requirements of the 
model, has shown its restrictive nature and the impossibility of achieving general 
equilibrium solutions in practice. Other important research has shown that an economic 
system has certain informational requirements and real costs associated with its 
functioning. These costs have been termed as “transaction costs” (Coase, 1937), and their 
presence results in the organization of economic activity in the real world in a manner 
quite different from that assumed by the neo-classical model. As Coase (1992 p: 718) has 
stated, “The time has surely gone in which economists could analyze in great detail two 
individuals exchanging nuts for berries on the edge of the forest and then feel that their 
analysis of the process of exchange was complete”, and therefore, “It makes little sense 
for economists to discuss the process of exchange without specifying the institutional 
setting within which the trading takes place, since this affects the incentives to produce 
and the costs of transacting”. At the behavioural level, a large literature now indicates 
that human beings act within a framework that can best be termed as one of “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1957). This includes the possibility of opportunistic behaviour, 
which would result in outcomes contrary to what the neo-classical model specifies 
(Williamson, 1975). 
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The theoretical critiques of the neo-classical model are well known, and our approach 
will not be to review or further elaborate on them. Rather, since the basic model, in spite 
of its theoretical weaknesses, still holds sway in development theory, we shall consider 
its applicability to the situation in developing countries, its ability to explain the 
functioning of these systems, the accuracy of its predictions, and based on this, whether it 
is a useful tool for development policy and practice. As Lucas (1986) has put it, a theory 
does not have to have impeccable foundations. The axioms are abstractions and 
necessarily “false”. However, the propositions need to have empirical validity to establish 
the range within which the abstractions are adequate. And as Friedman (1953 p: 10) 
states, a theory is more fruitful the “more precise the predictions, and the wider the area 




The application of the principles of neo-classical theory to the problems of growth and 
development is to be found in the neo-classical growth model. The approach assumes that 
all countries are on the same production function, so that differences in physical capital, 
labour and human capital, generate the differences in output (Solow, 2001). This vision 
has been fundamental to mainstream development thinking for the past 60 years. Based 
on this framework, it is possible to elaborate a series of propositions that lend themselves 
to empirical testing. The empirical studies have either used growth accounting techniques 
based on a Cobb-Douglas or similar neo-classical production function, or cross-country 
regressions, using variables that are generally used to measure factor accumulation, as 
independent parameters to explain variations in GDP growth rates. One of the earliest 
studies is that of Abramovitz (1956). Considering the sources of increase of national 
income in the U.S. between 1870-1953, he found that while net national product per head 
increased by 400% during this period, productivity per head rose by 250%. Based on this 
finding Abramovitz concluded that the main source of growth of output was not the 
labour or capital input per capita but the “complex little understood forces which cause 
productivity to rise”. These findings were confirmed by several other studies, including 
Denison (1967). Subsequent work by Young (1995), and Collins and Bosworth (1996), 
with data refinements that included proxies for human capital, has reversed these 
findings. They found that most of the contribution to GDP growth, particularly the high 
rates seen in the East Asian economies, came from high rates of physical and human 
capital accumulation rather than from productivity growth. At the cross-country level, the 
Barro regressions (1989) and the survey conducted by Levine and Renelt (1992), have 
confirmed that when considering variations in GDP growth rates, the positive correlation 
between GDP growth and the share of investment in GDP, is the most robust of all 
findings. Levine and Renelt find that for a sample of 119 countries over the period 1960-
1989, the investment/GDP ratio explains about half the variation in growth rates. 
 
Let us review these findings further in the context of a simple neo-classical specification, 
where output (Y) is a function of: F(K,L,H;A), where K is physical capital, L is labour, H 
is human capital, and A is the residual representing total factor productivity. Solow, 
(2001) states that if A(t) is considered in purely technological terms, given the standard 
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assumption of similar access to common technical knowledge in all economies, one 
would expect this value to be broadly similar for all countries. However, if the values and 
path of A(t) are empirically found to vary substantially from one country to another, this 
would suggest that the shape of the production surface varies from country to country. 
The traditional literature has focused on the technological factors that may account for 
these differences, such as externalities, adoption of low-cost appropriate technologies by 
developing countries, and variations in the sector composition of output. Non-
technological factors have generally been ignored. But as Solow (2001 p: 287), states 
“the non-technological sources of differences in total factor productivity may be more 
important than the technological ones. Indeed, they may control the technological ones, 
especially in developing countries”. Such a finding, which implies that the transformation 
of inputs into outputs is heavily influenced by non-technological factors, would of course 
have serious implications for the resource based neo-classical vision of economic growth, 
but it would open the way for alternatives models where factors such as policies and 
institutions may have a more significant influence on GDP growth. Since this is an 
empirical question, let us consider some of the evidence in this area. 
 
Collins and Bosworth (1996) using a standard neo-classical production function have 
decomposed the growth of output per worker into the contributions of the growth of 
physical capital per worker, the growth of education per worker, and a residual 
representing the growth of total factor productivity. The following table summarises this 
information for various regions of the world for the periods 1960-94 and 1984-94. 
 
(% points per year)    Growth of output per  Contribution of total 
                    worker      factor productivity(TFP) 
  
Region   1960-94 1984-94 1960-94 1984-94 
United States        1.1       0.9      0.3       0.7 
Other industrial countries    2.9       1.7      1.1       0.7 
East Asia        4.2       4.4      1.1       1.6 
Latin America       1.5       0.1      0.2      -0.4 
Middle East        1.6      -1.1     -0.3      -1.5 
Africa         0.3      -0.6     -0.6      -0.4 
 
Source: Collins and Bosworth (1996 p: 158-159) 
 
The data above shows that there are significant regional variations in the contribution of 
TFP to growth of output per worker, and there is no tendency for any convergence 
between the developing world and the levels obtaining in industrial countries over time, 
except perhaps in East Asia. In the industrial world the contribution of TFP has averaged 
around 40% for the whole period, rising to almost 80% in the U.S. during 1984-94. In 
East Asia there seems to have been a rising trend, with the contribution of TFP increasing 
to about 40% in the most recent 1984-94 period. In Latin America, the Middle East and 
Africa, on the other hand, particularly the latter, the negative effect of A, the residual, can 
be seen to have overwhelmed the positive contribution of physical capital and human 
capital. This resulted in zero or negative growth rates of output per worker. Clearly, in 
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these developing regions, inputs in the form of the traditional factors of production are 
not being converted into outputs as expected, because the transformation process is 
dominated by non-technological factors that are not taken account of in the neo-classical 
model. Reviewing the growth accounting literature, Easterly (2001a) confirms that it is 
the “residual” rather than factor accumulation which accounts for most of the income 
growth differences across countries. For a sample of 54 countries over the period 1960-
92, he finds that TFP growth accounts for 90% of the variation in growth rates of output 
per worker, after accounting for human capital accumulation. This result is similar to that 
of an earlier study covering 98 countries over the period 1960-95 by Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997). He further finds that while factor accumulation is persistent over 
time, the growth rates in developing countries between 1960-97 have been remarkably 
unstable. These facts do not provide support to models that emphasize factor 
accumulation. Thus Easterly concludes that while the experience of the United States 
may fit steady state models, they do not fit the experience of most developing countries. 
 
A further elaboration of the enormous variance in the contribution of total factor 
productivity as compared to the contributions of physical and human capital, can be 
found in Hall and Jones (1999). Using the usual growth accounting techniques and a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, they decompose output per worker into three 
components – the contributions of physical capital intensity, human capital per worker, 
and productivity. The data set is for 1988. It covers 127 countries, and the results have 
been presented as a ratio to U.S values. 
 
Contributions of Capital, Human Capital and Productivity: Ratios to U.S. Values 
Country   Y/L   (K/Y)
α/(1-α)       H/L      A 
 
United  States   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000 
West  Germany  0.818   1.118   0.802   0.912 
United  Kingdom  0.727   0.891   0.808   1.011 
 
Hong  Kong   0.608   0.741   0.735   1.115 
Japan    0.587   1.119   0.797   0.658 
Mexico  0.433   0.868   0.538   0.926 
Argentina   0.418   0.953   0.676   0.648 
U.S.S.R.   0.417   1.231   0.724   0.468 
 
India    0.086   0.709   0.454   0.267 
China    0.060   0.891   0.632   0.106 
Kenya    0.056   0.747   0.457   0.165 
Zaire    0.033   0.499   0.408   0.160 
 
Correlation with 
A  (logs)   0.889   0.248   0.522   1.000 
 
Source: Hall and Jones, 1999 p: 91 
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The table shows that output per worker in the developing world ranges from about 40% 
of the U.S. level in Latin America, to between 3%-8% of U.S. levels in selected African 
and Asian countries. This large variation is mainly accounted for by the variability of A, 
or the residual, which is supposed to reflect productivity. While capital intensity and 
human capital levels compare favourably between the developing world and the United 
States, being between 70%-80% or more of U.S. levels for capital intensity, and 40%-
50% or more for human capital, the contribution of productivity ranges between 10%-
25% for the selected Asian and African countries in our sample. This large variation in 
the productivity of the transformation process between developed and developing 
countries re-affirms our earlier conclusion that different regions are not on the same 
production surface. Hall and Jones emphasize that although the residual is traditionally 
taken to reflect technical change, it could in fact be a reflection of the policy 
environment, or more generally a measure of our ignorance, containing all the elements 
contributing to growth other than factor accumulation per se. This observation is 
supported by the data in the table above giving the correlation between A and the other 
variables. Here we find that the residual has a very high correlation with output per 
worker at almost 0.9. However, its correlation with human capital and capital intensity, 
the latter in particular, is comparatively low, suggesting that variables which are 
generally included in the broad definition of the factors of production, are not the key 
determinants of the level or rate of growth of output per worker in most low-income 
countries. 
 
Caselli (2005) summarising the key findings of the growth accounting literature states 
that it is now generally agreed that: 
 
Income = F (Factors, Efficiency). 
 
The consensus view is that “efficiency” plays a large role, accounting for at least 50% of 
the differences in per capita incomes. Studies that use a standard factor-only model to test 
for variance decomposition find that between 0.34 - 0.39 of the variance can be explained 
by differences in factor inputs, and that after controlling for factor accumulation, country-
specific effects play a large role in output differences. Caselli notes that the growth 
accounting method treats the multiplicative factor A as factor-neutral, implying that some 
countries use all of their inputs more efficiently than others. However, the wide variations 
in A suggest there are significant differences between countries in the efficiency use of 
labour and capital and their substitutability. This observation is supported by the fact that 
most of the world’s capital is produced in a small number of R&D intensive countries, 
with the rest generally importing this equipment or these designs (Eaton and Kortum, 
2001). Common technologies are therefore generally available worldwide. Consequently, 
the efficiency differences noted above are more likely to be caused by non-technological, 
rather than technological differences between countries.  
 
The discussion above suggests that neo-classical theory does not provide us with the best 
framework to understand the problems of growth and development. In fact, the variability 
of the economic performance of developing countries in the 60 years since the end of the 
Second World War, and their lack of a favourable response to the development policy 
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prescriptions of this theory, have led to considerable dissatisfaction with this view, and 
have been the main driver of the broader dimension of theoretical and empirical research 
that has dominated the literature in recent times. At a theoretical level, economists such 
as North (1981, 1990), Olson (2000), and others, have probed into the issue of the 
minimum attributes of an economic and political system that discourages predatory 
behaviour and encourages agents to act in a productive manner. This has moved the 
debate away the neo-classical focus on resources and factors of production, to the 
institutional frameworks that govern the process of exchange and transformation in a 
country. The central theme that has emerged from this new vision is that for economic 
agents to engage in productive behaviour, their property and contract rights need to be 
protected from violation and predatory activities. These require governance frameworks 
that promote the dispersion of economic and political power, ensure the maintenance of 
the rule of law, and guarantee the presence of an independent judicial system. Based on 
this line of thinking, a substantial body of empirical research is now available which 
considers the relationship between broad a range of economic and political variables, and 
economic performance. The main findings of this literature are summarised below. 
 
The empirical evidence given below has been divided into two tables. The first set of 
studies focus on the impact of a wide range of economic and political variables on GDP 
growth rates, but do not necessarily use the presence or absence of democracy as an 
independent explanatory variable. The second table consists of those studies that 
specifically attempt to assess the impact of democracy on economic performance. 
 




Major Independent Variables  Main findings 
Alesina (1997) 
 
Data on GDP 
growth for 100 
countries over the 
period 1970-1989. 
Economic: Initial income, 
human capital, investment/GDP, 
openness, initial inequality. 
Institutional: Socio-political 
instability, corruption, protection 
of property rights/contracts, 
democracy, civil liberties. 
Coefficients for rule of law, 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, 
protection of property/contracts, 
are all strongly significant. 
Democracy and civil liberties 
have no clear associations. 
Political/institutional variables 
taken together explain about ½ 




Study covers GDP 
growth rates and 
investment rates on 




Economic: Initial GDP, human 
capital proxies, government 
expenditure. 
Institutional: Nine indicators of 
institutional efficiency including 
bureaucratic efficiency, 
corruption, efficiency of legal 
system, orderly political process, 
political stability. 
Corruption has a strong 
negative association with the 
investment rate. Bureaucratic 
efficiency index is significantly 
and robustly associated with 
growth rates, after controlling 
for other variables. 




Impact on per 
capita GDP growth 
in 97 countries 
over the period 
1974-1989. 
Economic: Initial GDP, human 
capital proxies, government 
consumption. 
Institutional: ICRG Index, 
which includes rule of law, 
expropriation risk, corruption, 
quality of bureaucracy. BERI 
Index, which includes contract 
enforceability, risk of 
nationalization, bureaucratic 
delays. Various indicators of 
political stability included, such 
as revolutions and 
assassinations. 
Inclusion of the institutional 
variables increases the 
explanatory power of the 
growth regressions, with the 
ICRG Index having a similar 
effect to the secondary 
education variable. Security of 
property and contractual rights 
are found to be significant 
determinants of growth. 
Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
 
Data covers 127 





used to understand 
differences in 
output per worker. 
The estimated production 
function includes a social 
infrastructure measure, which is 
a combination of 2 indexes: the 
first in based on the ICRG index 
and includes rule of law, 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, 
risk of expropriation and 
government repudiation of 
contracts; the second is a 
measure of the openness of the 
country based on the Sachs-
Warner index (1995). Index 
ranges from 0 to 1. 
A difference of 0.01 in the 
social infrastructure index is 
associated with a 5.14% 
variation in output per worker. 
Applying this to the observed 
range of variation in social 
infrastructure, it is found that 
this accounts for much of the 




Study uses panel 
data from 100 
countries over the 
period 1965-1990 
to test for the 
conditional 
convergence of per 
capita income. 
Economic: Initial GDP, initial 
human capital, life expectancy, 
fertility, inflation, government 
consumption. 
Institutional: Rule of law index. 
The rule of law index based on 
ICRG is positively and 
significantly related to growth. 
A one rank improvement in the 
underlying index is associated 
with a 0.5 percentage point 
increase in the per capita growth 
rate.  






Study uses per 
capita GDP data 
for 1997 and 1998 




Institutional: Six aggregate 
governance indicators 
constructed out of 300 
governance measures covering 
civil liberties, independence of 
media, free elections, quality and 
independence of bureaucracy, 
rule of law, corruption, market 
friendly policies. 
Other: Historically motivated 
instrument variables used in 
other key studies 
Strong positive association 
between each of the six 
aggregate governance indicators 
and per capita incomes, infant 




Data on per capita 
GDP from 26 
countries in Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean. 
Institutional: Six aggregate 
governance indicators, and 
historically motivated instrument 
variables used in other key 
studies. 
Strong causal link running from 
better governance to higher per 
capita incomes, but weak link in 
the opposite direction i.e. higher 
incomes do not guarantee good 
governance in the long run. 
Rodrik, 
Subramaniam 
and Trebbi (2002) 
 
Study considers 
variance in per 
capita incomes, 
output per worker, 
and factor 
productivity in a 
sample of 140 
countries. 
Economic: Indicator 
representing trade openness and 
integration with world economy. 
Geographic: Indicator 
represented by variables such as 
area in tropics, distance from 
equator, prevalence of malaria, 
and access to the sea. 
Institutional: Institution 
variable using European settler 
mortality as an instrument, and 
rule of law index. 
Half the variance in per capita 
income levels is accounted for 
by the three variables used, with 
the institutional variable 
accounting for most of the 
difference. 
The institutional variable is 
found to be an important 
determinant of factor 
accumulation and productivity, 
while international integration 
and geography are not 
influential. 









indicators on per 
capita income 




indicators including European 
settler mortality, latitude, land-
locked situation, crop and 
mineral variables. Policy 
variables including inflation and 
openness. 
Institutional: Institutional Index 
based on Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
aggregate governance indicators. 
Simple regressions show that 
endowment indicators 
significantly explain both the 
cross-country variations in GDP 
and differences in institutional 
development. However, 2 stage 
least square results show the 
Institutional Index significantly 
explaining economic 
development, with endowments 
not explaining economic 
development beyond their 
ability to explain institutional 
development. Policy indicators 
are not significant once the 







1500 and per 
capita incomes 
today are 
compared for a 
sample of colonies, 
based on data from 
Maddison (2001). 
Economic: Urbanization in 1500 
used as a measure of early 
prosperity. Various instrument 
variables used for testing the 
hypothesis. 
Institutional: Security of 
property rights – from Political 
Risk Service; constraints on the 
Executive – from Gurr Polity III 
data set.   
Higher urbanization in 1500 has 
a significant negative 
correlation with lower GDP 
today and the current level of 
institutional development. 
Maddison’s (2001) data shows 
that many colonies in Asia and 
Latin America were richer than 
the United States between 1500 
and 1700. The reversal of 
fortunes occurred mostly in the 
late 18
th and early 19
th centuries. 
This reversal cannot be 
explained by the “geography’ 
hypothesis. 
Bloom and Sachs 
(1998) 
 
Study covering 77 
countries over the 
period 1965-1990, 
considers the role 




Africa and the rest 
of the world. 
Economic: Initial income, trade 
openness, government deficit. 
Institutional: quality of 
institutions. 
Geography: Various geography 
and demography variables 
including land area in tropics, 
coastal and inland population 
density, population growth rate, 
life expectancy. 
Two-thirds of Africa’s growth 
shortfall compared to other 
regions is due to various aspects 
of tropical geography, 
demography, and public health. 
One-third of the variation in 
growth of per capita incomes is 
due to economic policy and 
institutional quality related 
variables. 





studies on the role 





Measure of malaria risk added 
to a vector of institutional 
quality variables used in other 
key studies. 
Geography, human health, and 
environmental variables have a 
direct and significant effect on per 
capita income levels. They do not 
operate through institutions. This 
is shown by the fact that the 
malaria risk variable is 
statistically significant, thus 
explaining why malaria prone 
regions – mainly the tropics, have 
lower per capita income levels 







GDP per capita 
data for up to 71 
countries over the 
period 1960-2000, 
is used. 
Economic: Variables used in 
Barro (1996) regressions. 
Institutional: Eight 
institutional variables taken 
from the Polity IV database 
including, expropriation risk, 
government effectiveness, 
measure of autocracy, judicial 
independence, constitutional 
review process, etc. 
Other: European settler 
mortality and malaria risk used 
as instruments. 
Variables reflecting assessments 
of institutional quality such as 
risk of expropriation and 
government effectiveness, have 
significant coefficients. However, 
those representing constraints on 
the executive such as judicial 
independence, show no relation to 
growth. 
Settler mortality and malaria risk 
are highly correlated, and both are 
strong independent predictors of 
the current level institutional 
quality and constraints on the 
executive. 
Assessing countries in different 
groups, the study finds that: 
- initial levels of schooling are a 
strong predictor of institutional 
outcomes. 
- those with high initial human 
capital have grown twice as fast. 
- stable democracies have grown 
slightly faster than autocracies. 
- autocracies have a much higher 
dispersion of growth rates. 
 
All the studies reviewed above find that there is a strong relationship between economic 
growth, and variables representing institutional quality and the protection of property 
rights. These include the rule of law, quality of the bureaucracy, absence of corruption, 
expropriation risk, and enforceability of contracts. Most of the studies use regression 
techniques to arrive at their conclusions and find that much of the observed cross-country 
variation in per capita income levels can be explained by differences in institutional 
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quality. Hall and Jones (1999), using the production function approach, also come to the 
same conclusion. They find that differences in their social infrastructure index, which is 
essentially a measure of institutional quality, account for much of the variation in output 
per worker across countries. One study, Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), 
additionally finds that measures of good political governance such as free elections, the 
degree of civil liberties, and the independence of the media, have a strong and positive 
association with per capita income levels. Extending these findings, Kaufmann and Kray 
(2002) using data for 26 Latin American countries, conclude that there is a strong causal 
link from better governance to higher per capita incomes. 
 
While accepting the importance of institutions, three studies in our review emphasize the 
key role of variables which are more consistent with the neo-classical view of growth and 
development. Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Sachs (2003), argue that various aspects of 
tropical geography, and human health related variables, have a significant effect on per 
capita incomes. This impact is direct and does not operate through the quality of 
institutions. Glaser et al. (2004), on the other hand, do find that institutional quality has a 
strong effect on per capita income growth rates, but that the institutional outcomes 
themselves are determined by the initial level of schooling in a country i.e. initial human 
capital is a strong predictor of future growth rates. Disputing this point of view, we have 
Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi (2002), Easterly and Levine (2002), and Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2002). All these studies consider the relative importance of 
geography related variables and institutional quality on economic growth. Rodrik et al. 
(2002) find that geography is not influential, and that institutions are the most important 
determinant of productivity and factor accumulation. Acemoglu et al. (2002) show that a 
higher level of prosperity in 1500 is associated with a lower current level of institutional 
development and a lower current value of per capita GDP. This “reversal of fortunes” 
cannot be explained by the hypothesis that emphasizes geography related variables, 
because these variables have remained constant over time. In sum therefore, the 
overwhelming weight of evidence is that institution related variables and institutional 
quality, are key to explaining developmental outcomes, and that sustained growth in 
developing economies is not based on the parameters that neo-classical theory considers 
central. 
 
Table 2: Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth 
 
Study and Coverage  Major Independent Variables Main findings 
Barro (1996a) 
 
Study uses panel data 
from 100 countries over 
the period 1965-1990 to 
test for the conditional 
convergence of per 
capita income. 
Economic: Initial GDP, initial 
human capital, life expectancy, 
fertility, inflation, government 
consumption. 
Political: Democracy index 
using Gastil’s political rights 
classification. 
Growth increases with 
increased democracy at low 
levels of democracy, but the 
relationship turns negative 
once a moderate amount of 
political freedom has been 
attained. The turning point 
is about half way along the 
democracy scale. 




Study considers the 
relationship between 
democracy and growth 
rates of per capita GDP 
in a sample of 100 
countries over the period 
1960-1990. 
Economic: Standard variables 
used in growth analysis such as 
initial income, investment 
ration, various human capital 
measures, government 
consumption, black market 
premium. 
Political: Democracy index 
based on political rights 
indicator compiled by Gastil. 
The democracy coefficient 
in the growth equation is 
moderately negative but not 
statistically significant. 
However, the results also 
indicate that there is a non-
linear relationship between 
democracy and growth. The 
middle level of democracy 
is the most favourable to 
growth, whereas the lowest 
and highest groups do not 
have significantly different 
growth rates. 
Rodrik and Wacziarg 
(2005) 
 
Per capita GDP growth 
data for 154 countries 
from 1950-2000, is used. 
Political: Polity IV codes used 
to assess whether a country is a 
democracy or has gone through 
regime change. 
New democracies grow 
0.87 percentage points 
faster that those having no 
regime change. The growth 
effect of democratic 
transitions is even more 
significant and has a large 
magnitude in sub-samples 
only considering low 
income, ethnically diverse, 





Persson and Tabellini 
(2007) 
 
Panel data set on per 
capita income growth 
and nature of political 
regime, for over 70 
countries over the period 
1960-2000. 
Political: Regime classified as 
democracy as non-democracy 
based on whether Polity 2 
variable in the Polity IV data 
set is positive. 
The transition from 
autocracy to democracy is 
on average associated with 
a growth acceleration of 
about one percentage point. 




GDP data from 90 
countries over the 
period 1970-1990. 
Political: Countries 
divided into two groups – 
autocracies and 
democracies. 
No strong determinate relationship 
between level of political 
participation and long run growth 
rates. However, the coefficient of 
variation for GDP growth rates is 
much higher for autocracies as a 
group, as compared with 
democracies i.e. more risk and 
randomness of growth rates in 
autocracies. Countries with greater 
freedom also experience lower 
declines in growth when faced with 
shocks. 
 
The primary focus of the studies reviewed in Table 2 is the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. The general conclusion arrived at is that there is no 
strong association between democracy and growth, although there is some evidence to 
indicate that transitions from autocracy to democracy have a growth enhancing effect, 
particularly in low-income countries. Certainly, there is no evidence that autocracies, on 
average, perform better than democracies, and as Rodrik (1999) has shown, there is much 
greater randomness in the growth rates of autocracies, and democracies are better able to 
absorb the negative impact of shocks. Further, since the necessary conditions for the 
security of property and the protection of contractual rights, such as the rule of law, 
independence and quality of the bureaucracy, etc., are exactly the same as that for a 
lasting democracy, there are adequate grounds to suggest that the bias of development 
policy and practice should be towards the establishment of competitive economic and 
political systems. What is abundantly clear though, is that the overwhelming majority of 
empirical studies on growth show that variables of economic and political governance are 
central to determining development outcomes. Contrary to what neo-classical theory 
professes therefore, good institutions are much more important than high levels of 
resource flows. This conclusion of course, begs the question as to how these institutions 
can be brought into being. In the next section therefore, we shall consider how the 
necessary institutions which underlie successful economic growth, emerge.  
 
Alternate Paths of Institutional Development 
 
In Europe, the political and economic institutions that underlie modern economic growth 
took 400-500 years to be established. Their establishment occurred through a gradual 
historical evolution that commenced in the self-governing cities of northern Italy and the 
Netherlands, and gathered pace with the increasing power of the mercantile and capitalist 
classes in Great Britain. In the non-Western world however, the facts of the matter are 
that for whatever reason the necessary favourable institutions did not emerge 
incrementally or spontaneously during the same period. To explain the non-emergence of 
beneficent institutions in the non-Western world, North and others (North, Wallis and 
Weingast, 2006), have come up with an alternative conceptual framework to explain 
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institutional development. Anthropological literature indicates that primitive societies 
were extremely violent (Keely, 1996). North argues that first and foremost this human 
violence needed to be contained for any society to develop a social order. Historically, 
the end of the Ice Age is seen as the point of transition from primitive to post primitive 
society. During this period the state began to emerge in some form or the other, as the 
primary mechanism for controlling violence. Left to themselves dominant elites, based on 
their control over the instruments of violence, inevitably asserted themselves and 
established a rent-seeking natural state. Such a rent-seeking state prevents disorder and 
enhances social stability by creating a set of self-enforcing agreements amongst the elites. 
North argues that the natural state has been the dominant social order for the past 10,000 
years or so. It is a stable social order in the sense that the economic, political, military and 
religious systems are organically related to each other. And given the persistence of 
institutions, fundamental changes in one system cannot occur without fundamental 
changes in the others. 
 
However, given that the natural state is based on a balance of violence, it can also be seen 
to have an inherent fragility. This could break down from time to time, leading to civil 
wars and state failure, as we have seen in many parts of the developing world during the 
20
th century. To progress beyond the natural state and achieve a more stable social order, 
the new institutional economics literature suggests that an evolutionary process must be 
gone through led by the dominant elites. This process is seen as happening incrementally, 
at the margin, and one that gradually extends the access of the majority to the 
organizations of control in a society. However, as North and others in this tradition agree, 
there is nothing automatic about a transition from a natural state to what they call an 
“open access order”, where the use of violence has either been reduced or eliminated as a 
means of political and economic competition. The question therefore still remains as to 
how a society can establish the institutions required to eliminate fragility and allow 
sustainable economic development to occur. In spite of the established superiority of 
these systems, outside Europe and North America, historically there have been few 
spontaneous transitions, with most democracies having emerged as accidents of history. 
Even the upsurge of democracy after the Second World War was mainly the result of the 
victorious countries forcing their political perspective on the newly emerging countries. 
Autonomous transitions to economic and political democracy are therefore rare. 
 
Although traditional economic theory has no answers to these questions, a study of what 
has been termed as modern economic theory, seems to provide us with some answers. 
The proponents of these ideas, such as Stiglitz (1989), Hoff (2000), and Hoff & Stiglitz 
(2001), argue that the presence of information problems, transaction costs and 
distributional considerations affect the nature of contracts, incentive structures, and 
therefore outcomes. These factors are seen as being fundamentally dependent on the 
institutional framework, historical legacy, and the distribution of wealth in a particular 
society. Even with similar endowments therefore, different historical initial conditions 
and cultural beliefs will influence agent expectations such that multiple equilibria and 
low-level equilibrium traps will result. Furthermore, where path dependent processes and 
self-enforcing mechanisms are at work, vested interests will ensure that sub-optimal 
situations continue to persist even if alternative Pareto superior equilibria are known to 
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exist. Elaborating on this model, Bardhan (2001) discusses the impact of an unequal 
distribution of wealth and asymmetries in bargaining power, on outcomes. He argues that 
vested interests will resist changes to their pre-existing rent extraction machinery because 
of the uncertain prospect of a share in a potentially larger future pie. Such collective 
action problems will cause the persistence of dysfunctional or sub-optimal institutions. 
Modern economic theory therefore, supports the view that there is no guarantee that local 
evolutionary processes determined by the culture and historical conditions in a country 
will generate the institutions required for sustainable economic growth. Thus, in the 
presence of low-level equilibrium traps, the only way to achieve institutional change and 
move to a higher-level equilibrium is for an exogenous intervention to occur. Hoff (2000) 
gives various examples of the success of such interventions, such as affirmative action in 
the U.S., the Korean anti-corruption campaign in 1961, and how a law based on a social 
norm can move society to new equilibrium with better enforcement. These arguments 
reinforce the view that the basic postulates of neo-classical theory do not hold over a 
considerable range of economic activities and that the model cannot provide an adequate 
basis to explain the existing reality or the process of change in the developing world. 
 
Discontinuous Institutional Change 
 
The discussion above indicates that the West European model of institutional change in 
which development is seen as an evolutionary outcome of the internal characteristics of a 
society such as beliefs, culture, and historical legacy, has limited applicability. More 
generally, this characterization of the process of economic development ignores the more 
recent history of political and economic change in many parts of the world. An 
observation of 20
th century history shows us that in large parts of the non-Western world, 
fundamental changes in economic and political institutions were brought about through a 
discontinuous process involving the conscious intervention of human agency. This 
agency was characterized by the actions of keys individuals or small highly motivated 
groups within a country, or in some cases even a powerful external force, with 
interventions occurring in a historically abrupt rather than evolutionary manner. It is 
noteworthy that the new and intrusive institutions introduced in this episodic manner, 
were based on ideas and values that were not in consonance with the prevailing cultural 
attitudes and belief systems, or the traditional interest structures in these countries. To 
substantiate this thesis we discuss key periods of change in a number of countries in Asia 
and Africa where favourable institutional transitions have occurred. These are Japan, 
India, Turkey, and Botswana. 
 
A review of discontinuous institutional change over the past hundred years or so indicates 
that it has been primarily of two types. The first has been where direct intervention by an 
external force or the collapse of the main external support of a regime, has enabled 
progressive economic and political groups already present in a particular society to gain 
dominance. In such cases, while the emergent groups may have been representatives of 
significant social classes, historically due to collective action problems, they did not have 
the capability to challenge the supremacy of the ruling political coalitions until such time 
as the external intervention occurred. In this category, for instance, we would find Japan, 
where at the end of the Second World War, the US and its allies swept aside the old 
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dominant feudal coalition and put in its place an externally dominated administration that 
lasted for almost a decade. During this period fundamental institutional changes were 
brought about, and social groups opposed to the old feudal-military coalition gained 
ascendance. We could also include here much of what happened in Eastern Europe after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, progressive social forces that had 
been evolving prior to the communist take over, were given renewed impetus and were 
able to topple the weakened externally supported regimes after 1990. 
 
The second model has been where the main driver of change has been a radical or elite 
domestic group committed to modernization and socio-economic reform. This process is 
to be found in countries such as Turkey, but more predominantly in the post-colonial 
third world. In the latter case, generally speaking, more efficient institutions were put in 
place as part of the negotiated settlement during the decolonization process between the 
old colonial masters and the elites leading the liberation movements. In most countries, 
particularly in Africa, these institutions did not suit the interests of these new elites, and 
as a consequence the structures and systems decayed. In some countries however, the 
super-structure of new institutions endured and played a catalytic role in promoting the 
growth of larger social forces whose interests in the long term underpinned the success of 
these very systems. India and Botswana could be considered as examples of this model. 
The four case studies therefore, chosen to elaborate the thesis of discontinuities in 
institutional development are Japan, Turkey, India, and Botswana. All four cases 
highlight the role of human agency, with strong historical evidence showing that the 
institutional trajectories of these countries were influenced by non-evolutionary 
interventions undertaken either by a small domestic elite or an external force, over a 
relatively short period of time. 
 
Japan: The analysis of Japanese history given below is based on Gordon (2003), and the 
comparative history work of Barrington Moore Jr. (1967). The Meiji Restoration of 1868 
was a feudal revolution, with the Emperor becoming the embodiment of national unity, 
beliefs and traditions. By Imperial decree in 1871, all feudal domains were abolished and 
converted into prefectures or administrative units under the control of the central 
government. However, the land tenure system in agriculture continued to be dominated 
by landlord-tenant relations. Through the Land Tax of 1873, the state put in place a 
mechanism for extracting revenues from the peasantry that could be re-directed towards 
modernization. Daimyo and other aristocratic families became dominant members of the 
financial oligarchy. By 1880, it is estimated that 44% of the stock in national banks 
belonged to the new peers. The industrialization that occurred was therefore very much in 
the feudal military tradition of the country, with the main impulse for economic growth 
coming from the Meiji government, now in the hands of a “progressive” feudal-
commercial nobility. The business sector led by the zaibatsu, which emerged during this 
period, was also structured in a feudal manner and shared the socio-political views of the 
ruling elite. 
 
The dominant elites during the Meiji period kept political change under control. Although 
a new Constitution with a Diet or parliament was created in 1889, the right to vote was 
given to a very limited electorate and only men of substantial property were eligible to 
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become members of the assembly. Out of a population of 50 million, about 460,000 men 
received electoral rights. The elites propagated the view that obedience to the state and 
emperor was the highest secular obligation of an individual. In spite of a veneer of 
constitutional government therefore, the period was characterized by bureaucrats and 
generals ruling the country in the name of the Emperor. The mass movements and urban 
riots during the early part of the 20
th century ushered in what has been termed as the 
period of “imperial democracy”. In 1925, adult male suffrage was introduced and the first 
elections were held in 1928. However, elected politicians and the cabinets formed by 
them continued to play a limited role in government. The military, the bureaucracy, and 
men of substance, continued to wield political power through out the period. In any event 
these superficial democratic structures did not last long. By the early 1930’s the country 
had reverted to open authoritarian rule. Until the Second World War therefore, Japan was 
a feudal society with belief systems dominated by Confucian concepts of loyalty, 
obedience and piety. 
 
As part of the post war solution, the Allies imposed a new political and economic system 
on the country, the new framework being based on western structures and values. In the 
seven years after 1945, the Allies rewrote laws, restructured the economic and political 
system, and sought to influence culture and beliefs. In 1946, a new Constitution was 
promulgated which guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. Compulsory 
education up to ninth grade was introduced and the public universities opened to all. 
Democracy was to be the corner stone of the new Japan. Land was expropriated from the 
feudal class and distributed to tenants. The ownership and control of zaibatsu were taken 
away from family companies. As a consequence of these measures significant impetus 
was given to the previously subordinated business classes, and Japan witnessed the 
growth of a substantial middle class. Over the past 50 years, the exogenously inspired 
political and economic structures created in the immediate post-war period, have in the 
main endured and strengthened. As a result of the new egalitarian culture, traditional 
values were undermined, a fact noted by many Japanese authors of the protest school. Of 
course, in some ways institutional structures have been modified to integrate more 
traditional Japanese ways of thinking and precepts of behavior. However, the profound 
changes in Japan’s political and economic system, its culture and values, as compared 
with the pre-war period, are there for all to see. 
 
India: The analysis below has been drawn from many sources, but is primarily based on 
Spear (1978) and Brown (1985). Pre-independence India was characterized by a semi-
feudal, colonial economy, with a small middle class and some limited democratic 
structures. The Mutiny of 1857 resulted in the old aristocratic classes being finally 
discredited as leaders of Indian society. British policy also changed to accommodate 
more Indians from the newly emerging educated classes into the mechanisms of 
consultation in government.  In spite of this however, until the early part of the 20
th 
century, this role whether at the central or provincial level remained primarily 
consultative. The social base of the nationalist movement also continued to remain small. 
In the 20 years between 1864-1885, 5000 Indians obtained the B.A. degree, and at the 
turn of the century there were only about 30,000 graduates out of a population of 220 
million. Although there were the beginnings of industrialization in the 1850’s, this was 
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concentrated in the Bombay and Bengal Presidencies. By 1892/93 there were about 150 
cotton and jute mills employing about 180,000 workers. In addition, the coal industry had 
emerged in central India, and the plantation industry, mainly in Assam. A significant 
proportion of these industries continued to be owned by Europeans, so the extent of 
industrialization is by no means an indication of the degree to which an indigenous 
capitalist class had developed. For instance, all the jute mills in Bengal, and 622 out of a 
total of 652 tea plantations, were owned by Europeans. 
 
The Liberal victory in Britain in 1906, gave impetus to the efforts to win the goodwill of 
the Indian political classes and to bring more Indians into closer association with the 
government and administration. Through the Indian Councils Act of 1909, both the 
Imperial Legislative Council and the Provincial Councils were expanded to now include a 
certain proportion of directly elected seats. However, the electorate for these seats 
remained extremely small and based on a limited property franchise. The intensification 
of the independence movement during the early part of the 20
th century, and the advent of 
the First World War, resulted in more significant reforms in 1919. Under the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms, a new Legislative Assembly was created with 140 seats, of which 
106 were elected. The official majorities in both the Viceroy’s Council and the Provincial 
Councils, were abolished. The limited franchise of 1909 was increased to include a 
nationwide property qualification, as well as special qualifications such as a university 
degree. The newly constituted Provincial Councils had an electorate of 5 million, and the 
Legislative Council one of about 1 million. Taken together this meant that about 2.8% of 
the population had been enfranchised. Although this was a very small percentage of the 
total population, there is little doubt that these reforms meant that a move had been made 
from bureaucratic control to more representative forms of government, and from a 
limited to a mass electorate. 
  
The inter-war period saw further internal integration of the Indian economy, an expansion 
of industry, the further growth of an educated middle class, and a strengthening of the 
freedom movement. All this culminated in the Government of India Act of 1935. This 
was a point of no return in terms of constitutional development. Dominion status was 
accepted as the goal, federalism the framework, and parliamentary institutions as the 
accepted form of government. The powers of the Provincial Assemblies and Provincial 
Ministries were expanded to all areas of government, and the electorate significantly 
increased. The franchise was still property based, but its scope enlarged to include about 
30 million voters, or about 1/6
th the adult population. In the provinces the influence went 
largely into Indian hands. The importance of the 1935 Act can be seen from the fact that 
significant elements of the post-Independence constitution were drawn from it. The 
institutional transformation of the structures of governance in India took place largely as 
a consequence of the Acts of 1919 and 1935. They essentially transplanted modified 
forms of Western political institutions into Indian society. The Indian elite accepted them 
as appropriate mechanisms for the satisfaction of the needs and aspirations of an Asian 
society, although the new institutions were based on ideas which were alien to indigenous 
structures and ideologies. At Independence in 1947, the role and influence of these 
institutions remained relatively limited. Cultural attitudes continued to be dominated by 
the hierarchical requirements of the caste system, and traditional beliefs conditioned by 
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karma or the inevitability of ones fate, and consequent passivity. Nevertheless, the 
institutions had the ideological commitment of the political leadership and support from 
broad elements within the small but influential middle class. In this sense therefore, the 
new institutions were a radical break from the past. As happened in the case of Japan, as 
well, they were put in place over a relatively short historical period of time. 
 
Over the past 60 years, the adoption of a political system based on democratic values and 
the promotion of a capitalist market economy (albeit hesitantly in the initial years), has 
had a fundamental impact on values and belief systems in India. By some estimates India 
now has a middle class of about 300 million people whose values, in spite of indigenous 
variations, are not very different from their western counterparts. Competition and 
advancement are the slogans of new India rather than passivity and inevitability. 
Democratic values are now deeply ingrained in the minds of the people, with high voter 
turn out, and aggressively fought elections. 
 
Turkey: Turkey provides a third example of key role played by human agency, and how 
this factor by bringing about abrupt changes in institutional structures can result in 
fundamental shifts in economic and political frameworks, and consequently in belief 
systems. During the early part of the 20
th century, Turkey was characterized by the 
institutions of the decaying Ottoman Empire. It was essentially a backward semi-feudal 
state dominated by Islamic principles of behavior and social organization. The war of 
independence against invading Greek forces between 1921-22 was led by Kemal Ataturk 
and gave him enormous popularity and prestige. This enabled him to lead a process that 
led to the radical modernization of Turkey (Shaw and Ezel, 1977). Kemal Ataturk 
borrowed heavily from the western model. His social and political revolution set the stage 
for the future adoption of systems more closely aligned with western structures and their 
underlying value systems. In 1923 the Caliphate was abolished. A new constitution was 
adopted in 1924. During 1924-25, religious schools were closed, the monastic order was 
suppressed and their lands confiscated, and secular education was introduced. In 1926, a 
new civil code was adopted which gave women voting rights as well as equal rights in 
marriage and property. These institutional changes undermined the power of the old 
feudal classes and facilitated the growth of an indigenous mercantile/capitalist class. 
Ataturk died in 1938, but his institutions endured and generated socio-economic forces, 
which over time strengthened the foundations of these very institutions. 
 
In 1945 the period of single party rule ended and a system of multi-party politics was 
established. Although the subsequent three decades were marked by considerable 
instability and military coups, today Turkey has a democratic system with over 50 
registered political parties which are entitled to public funding. In 1961, Turkey adopted 
its first Constitution based on democratic principles and the protection of human rights. 
This Constitution was revised and approved by a referendum in 1982. Under the 1982 
Constitution, the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary, was further entrenched. The judiciary now functions independently, with an 
apex Constitutional Court whose role it is to ensure that all laws and decrees passed by 
the government are in conformity with the Constitution. Since 1981, the government has 
undertaken major economic reforms to liberalize the economy and establish a market-
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based system. These reforms have enabled the Turkish economy to achieve high rates of 
growth in recent times. In 1995, a customs union was established with the European 
Union. As a result of these radical changes, in spite of the recent revitalization of Islam in 
Turkey, the economic and political systems are converging to the west European model 
and full membership of the EU is a possibility in the foreseeable future. It is indeed 
striking that Turkey is the only major country in the Islamic world which has maintained 
a relatively “open society” with democratic institutions over a long period of time. This 
success can be largely attributed to the radical institutional reforms brought about by 
Kemal Ataturk, and the socio-economic changes to Turkish society that evolved as 
consequence of these reforms. 
 
Botswana:  When Botswana gained independence in 1966, it was one of the poorest 
countries of Africa. It had no roads, a handful of university graduates, and nearly half of 
its active male population worked outside the country. Since then, while the rest of Africa 
stagnated, Botswana achieved one of the highest growth rates of per capita income in the 
world, and made significant progress in improving its human and social development 
indicators. Diamonds, which now account for about 40% of GDP, have of course made a 
significant contribution to this achievement. However, unlike in other parts of Africa, 
they have not been a resource curse, encouraging rent seeking and predatory activities by 
the ruling elite. Botswana has not suffered from the neo-patrimonialism which is 
characteristic of most African states, and which has undermined economic performance 
throughout the continent. There is general consensus that the success of the country is to 
be found in good governance. Since independence there have been freely contested 
elections. The government has followed good economic policies, which have protected 
private property and limited predation. Of the six widely used indicators of governance 
(Kaufmann and Kray, 2002), Botswana has the highest scores in Africa for government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. In some of these categories, 
Botswana scores better than France and Japan. 
 
The institutions of a liberal democratic state were put in place by the British colonial 
masters around the time of independence. It is generally agreed that human agency in the 
form of Seretse Khama, first President of Botswana, his deputy Quett Masire, and their 
group, was responsible for the consolidation of democratic structures, the establishment 
of an effective and relatively uncorrupt bureaucracy, the rule of law, and the pursuance of 
good economic policies in the country. However, recent studies have down played this 
role, and suggested that the favourable economic and political outcomes are a 
consequence of certain inherent factors in Tswana society (Robinson and Parsons, 2006; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Two major factors have been mentioned in 
these studies as the underlying reasons for Botswana’s particular trajectory of 
institutional development. Firstly, it is argued that the Tswana developed a state in pre-
colonial times, with institutions which limited the power of chiefs and ruling elites. The 
main focus here is the kgotla or popular assembly, which was used to discuss and endorse 
any major decision to be taken by the community. Secondly, emphasis is given to the fact 
that the political elites in control of the state at the time of independence were heavily 
invested in the country’s most important economic activity – ranching. It is suggested 
that this limited predation. 
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We shall argue here that none of these factors were peculiar to Tswana society, and in 
fact taken in conjunction with other variables, indicate that Botswana was ripe for the 
kind of neo-patrimonialism and predation seen in other post-independence African 
societies. Historically, Botswana consists of eight inter-related Tswana chiefdoms. 
Considering African political systems, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) state that 
unlike many of the stateless tribal societies on the continent, the Tswana states fall into 
that category of societies which had the formal political and administrative structures 
which we normally associate with government. Schapera (1940) analyzing the political 
organization of the Ngwato, the largest of the Tswana tribes, elaborates on this issue. The 
Ngwato had centralized authority, an administrative machinery, and judicial institutions, 
within which there were sharp divisions of rank, status and wealth corresponding to the 
distribution of power and authority. The chief was the central figure around whom tribal 
life revolved. “He is at once it ruler and judge, maker and guardian of its law, and 
director of its economic life” (Schapera, 1940 p 64). Although all significant matters of 
tribal concern were dealt with before the assembly of adult men in the kgotla, and it was 
not unknown for the assembly to overrule the wishes of tribal leaders, the decisions made 
were generally the same as those arrived at previously by the chief and his personal 
advisors (Schapera, 1940 p 72). Opposition if any, was bound to be cautious, for fear of 
reprisals. Kgama III, the great chief of the Ngwato (1837-1923), for instance, was known 
to brook no opposition. For the most part, the kgotla was a vehicle to mobilize public 
support for decisions already made by the community’s political elite (Molutsi and Holm 
1990). The kgotla also, was not inclusive in that it excluded women, younger adult males 
and most minority groups, from its deliberations (Schapera, 1955). In sum therefore, the 
indigenous polity was highly authoritarian and had little semblance of democracy. The 
country’s social class structure was rigidly hierarchical and various authorities have 
indicated that it was probably one of the most inequalitarian in Africa (Holm, 1988). 
 
Comparing Botswana with other traditional African societies, it further needs to be noted 
that there was nothing exceptional about the Tswana kgotla. Most pre-colonial African 
societies, particularly cattle owning ones, had similar consultative and decision-making 
structures, such as the oluhia of the Bantu, and the tribal assemblies of the Masaai, Nuer 
and Dinka of Eastern Africa. Neighbouring regions such as Basutoland (subsequently 
Lesotho) as well, had similar structures, but these did not promote a democratic polity. In 
Lesotho for instance, soon after independence, the Basutoland National Party led by 
Chief Lebua Jonathan mounted a coup after losing in the elections. The difference 
between Botswana and rest of Africa however, was that in the former, the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) under Seretse Khama reinforced and amplified the tradition of 
the  kgotla so that over time it became an integral part of the country’s democratic 
institutions (Holm, 1988). Thus around the time of independence the practice of “freedom 
squares” was started. Under this system any political party or group of political activists 
had the right to call a freedom square, with very few limits on the freedom of speech. The 
freedom square has endured and strengthened over the years, and has become one of the 
main forums for political debate in the country. Our analysis therefore, indicates that it is 
not the inherent nature of the kgotla, but the manner in which the ruling elites in 
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Botswana used this traditional institution to enhance the democratic polity, which needs 
to be emphasized. 
 
Let us now consider the role of indigenous cattle ranchers, or what has been termed the 
“beefocracy”, in influencing Botswana’s favourable institutional outcomes. Historically, 
the chiefs dominated the tribal economy, allocating land, and until the end of the 19
th 
century, controlling or owning all the cattle. As a consequence, at independence in 1966, 
large cattle ranchers were a small group led by Seretse Khama, and consisted mainly of 
the traditional aristocracy and socio-political elite. This economic reality is reflected in a 
survey undertaken in 1974, eight years after independence, which showed that Botswana 
was not only a very poor country but had very high inequalities in income and the 
ownership of assets, mainly cattle. The level of inequality was comparable with some of 
the most unequal countries in Latin America. As Acemoglu et al. (2001) themselves 
admit, such an environment where a very small fraction of the population hold all the 
economic and political power is not the most ideal for the general security of property 
rights. The institution of property, for its preservation, requires that effective property 
rights and ownership be spread over a large segment of the population. Engermann and 
Sokoloff (1997) analyzing the differential growth performance of Latin America and the 
United States, point out that there was virtual parity in the GDP per capita between these 
two regions in the 1700’s. The divergent paths of the two regions since then can be 
explained by reference to the superiority of institutions in the latter, namely more 
political rights, greater democracy, less rent seeking, more security of property, etc. They 
ascribe this to the fact that in the United States the economy centered around family 
farms and independent proprietors, leading to a more equal distribution of wealth and 
more democratic political institutions. In Latin America on the other hand, there was 
concentration of wealth and extreme inequality. Control of the state by such elites led to 
laws and legislation designed to inhibit the spread of commercial activities to the general 
population, and to protect their economic interests and privileges. This resulted in the 
establishment of authoritarian, rent seeking regimes. 
 
In addition to the problem of inequalities, Botswana’s situation was further compounded 
by the fact that the state had practically no resources at independence, and between 1966 
and 1971 was financially dependent on Britain to cover the costs of administration and 
development. When the diamond revenues came on stream in 1971 therefore, the 
fundamental socio-economic realities in Botswana were that there was small powerful 
elite, there were gross inequalities of income and wealth, the population at large was 
illiterate with a handful of school and university graduates, and the state was poor. In the 
circumstances there were no incentives for the so-called “beefocracy” to limit rent 
seeking and put in place a system that protected property rights. On the contrary, these 
factors suggest that the country was ripe for the establishment of a neo-patrimonial state 
once the indigenous elites had taken over the reins of government. Based on this 
evidence, it is difficult not to ascribe the good institutions, and the good economic and 
political governance observed, to a conscious choice made by the political elites led by 
Seretse Khama. Even the kgotla, which as we noted has been emphasized by some 
researchers, was actually enhanced and transformed from being a pre-colonial instrument 
of control by traditional elites, into an important mechanism within Botswana’s 
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democratic institutions for promoting inclusiveness and consensus building. Botswana’s 
experience therefore, like Turkey’s under Kemal Ataturk, is a powerful example of the 




In the discussion above we have seen that institutions are central to developmental 
outcomes. This powerful role is a direct consequence of their ability to determine the 
incentives generated by a system, which of course have a determining influence on 
human behaviour. The key assumption that permits the neo-classical model to postulate 
an institution free vision of the efficient functioning of markets is that of individual 
rationality. By rationality here is meant that individuals behave to maximize utility or 
self-interest, and the content of this self-interest is specified in terms of wealth or pay 
offs. Once this assumption is dropped, and a wider range of motivational assumptions is 
accepted to explain human behaviour, there is no longer any guarantee that the 
institutions that emerge in a particular society will be beneficent or appropriate for the 
efficient functioning of an economic system. A number of psychologists have in fact, 
argued that human nature is far more complex than that assumed by neo-classical 
economics, with ideologies, altruism, and standards of conduct derived from beliefs and 
culture, being equally important determinants of behavior. In such circumstances an 
individual may not define self-interest in terms of wealth maximization. Plott (1986) for 
instance, states that from the point of view of evolutionary biology, the definition of 
individual self-interestedness could be seen as one of maximizing the survival potential 
of an actor and his genes in future generations. In such a socio-biological model rational 
self-interest would imply nepotism, which included protecting the interests of ones 
relatives and direct descendants. This would result in totally different pattern of 
individual behaviour than that predicted by standard economic theory.  
 
While such alternative behavioural hypotheses may create difficulties for neo-classical 
theory, they are likely to open the way for a more realistic understanding of institutional 
change and economic development. Following on such evolutionary behavioural models, 
at a very basic level it is probably more appropriate to view human beings as predators 
and pirates whose instincts for survival emerged out of the hunting Pliestocene, rather 
than as the rational selfish individual who was part of the new bourgeoisie which 
emerged during late middle ages in Europe. Such a view of human nature would be far 
more consistent with the anthropological evidence on primitive man, as compared to that 
suggested by the rationality model. Dismissing the commonly held view of the “noble 
savage”, in 1941 the great ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski observed that 
anthropology had done more harm than good in confusing the issue by depicting human 
ancestry as living in a golden age of perpetual peace. In a detailed study of violence 
before civilization, Keeley (1996) has used ethnographic and archaeological evidence to 
show that conflicts and predation were common factors in pre-state societies such as 
tribes, bands and chiefdoms. Thus predation is a much deeper reality of human history, 
while “rational” behaviour a more recent and perhaps more shallow phenomenon. From 
the point of view of economic science, by predatory behaviour we mean the forcible 
encroachment upon the endowments of other people. This contrasts with the behavioural 
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assumptions of neo-classical theory, where an individual limits himself to using his own 
endowments and acquiring the fruits of his own labour peacefully. Based on this 
evidence, if rationality is rejected in favour of predation as an underlying basis for 
understanding instinctual human behaviour, we argue that a more useful explanatory 
hypothesis for institutional and economic change can be developed. 
 
A starting point for such a hypothesis would be the Hobbesian view that given 
humanity’s natural condition of war against each other, it is only by common agreement 
to certain restraints or covenants of behaviour that the natural state of violence can be 
transcended. Developing on this theme we have Douglass North’s (1981, 1990) insights 
that institutions are the formal and informal rules of the game, and their enforcement 
characteristics, which human beings have devised to govern interaction amongst 
themselves. The initial formation of such rules and their subsequent accumulation as the 
social capital of that society are determined by cultural beliefs, the origins of which are to 
be found in the anthropology, sociology and history of a country or region. By social 
capital we mean the informal norms, obligations and expectations that have evolved from 
prior social interaction, and which determine trust and other forms of cooperative 
behaviour in a society. Such capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors, 
enhances the information and coordination of markets, reduces transaction costs, and 
eventually contributes to the efficiency of productive processes (Coleman, 2000). 
However, it is also in the nature of social capital that once it begins to accumulate and 
become more elaborate, it will increasingly influence future modes of behaviour. The 
behavioural rules at a particular moment of time will therefore vary, depending on the 
interaction between the existing institutions, both formal and informal, in a society and 
basic instincts for predation and survival that we have inherited from the past. 
 
In a primitive society with no formal institutions and limited social capital, the basic 
instinct to survive would ensure that behaviour was primarily opportunistic or predatory. 
As a society develops agricultural communities and feudal institutions, survival and 
betterment would probably necessitate purely opportunistic behaviour to be over ridden 
by new rules such as loyalty to ones tribe, clan and eventually the ruler. Finally, with the 
growth of capitalism and its formal institutions to regulate impersonal interaction and 
exchange, human beings would be encouraged to act in a more self-interested yet benign 
manner. The creation of a more well defined set of opportunities available within an 
established institutional matrix would limit predation and encourage the development of 
value systems which could, in principle, approximate the paradigm of rationality found in 
neo-classical economic theory. Where a well-established institutional matrix exists, an 
actor could be expected to limit his choice to a basket of opportunities which lies within 
his own budget and capabilities, rather than trying to take away the endowments of other 
individuals by choosing to rob, steal, plunder, or act in a predatory manner (Bardhan, 
2000). As predators and pirates we therefore respond to the incentives contained in the 
economic and political institutions we are confronted with, and change our behaviour 
accordingly. This characterization of the role of institutions in conditioning beliefs and 
value systems does not in any way deny the validity of the historical arguments which 
show causation to be in the opposite direction. The comparative history literature has 
convincingly shown us the fundamental role played by religion, culture, homogeneity and 
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historical legacy, in determining the speed and depth of modern economic and political 
development. It only shows that the reverse effects of institutions on value systems is 
equally relevant, particularly in the context of the 20
th century. 
 
If human nature is viewed in this continuum from predatory to rational, in a socially 
undeveloped and institutionally backward society, a small group that has gained 
ascendancy due to historical, ethnic or religious factors, will then be naturally motivated 
to use its political power to act in a predatory manner and use the resources of the state 
for the benefit of its limited constituency. Efforts to introduce more productive systems of 
economic and political governance in such circumstances will fail because the group will 
subvert these processes for its own benefit. However, with economic growth as the size 
of the elite group, or groups, increases in a particular society, there is greater need for 
certain rules of interaction to emerge so that predatory activities do not result in conflict 
and mutual destruction. It could be argued that as the size of dominant economic groups 
increases, at some point diminishing returns to predation set in. The accumulation of 
informal rules of interaction or social capital, would then form the basis for formal 
institutional development and ensure that as a society progresses, and the size of 
dominant groups become a larger and larger proportion of the population, human beings 
increasing behave in what is considered to be a rational self-interested manner, resulting 
in the social good. 
 
In this model, predation and piracy are now constrained by institutional development, in 
which are embedded both informal and formal rules of behaviour, which although 
perhaps contrary to our basic instincts are accepted as necessary for mutual benefit, and 
which over the course of time become habitual to our thought and practice. This view 
enables us to understand why societies with large middle classes have higher levels of per 
capita income, achieve higher rates of economic growth, have more stable institutional 
structures, and have a greater consensus on rules and systems for the enforcement of 
rules, as compared to other societies (Easterly, 2001b). It is also consistent with the 
historical fact that in societies where a long period of evolutionary institutional 
development has resulted in mature economic and political institutions, abrupt changes 
are not generally observed. The arguments presented above can be graphically expressed 
as follows (Chakravarti, 2005): 
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The figure above shows the relationship between the development of institutions and the 
progression from predatory to rational behaviour. The X-axis shows institutional 
development, while the Y-axis shows increasing levels of economic rationality, in the 
standard neo-classical sense. Starting from a base level primitive society there would 
have to be some institutional creation up to point a, before any change in predatory 
activity could be expected. This would probably be in the form of an accumulation of 
informal rules of social behaviour. Subsequently, opportunistic behaviour is likely to 
respond slowly to institutional creation until a threshold of institutional development has 
been reached. This threshold level would be one where formal and informal rules have 
reached a point sufficient to underpin the emergence of incrementally more complex 
impersonal structures of exchange. Once a high level of rationality is reached, further 
institutional development is likely to have a limited impact on economic behaviour. 
 
In this model, culture, beliefs, homogeneity and historical legacy have a central role to 
play in the interaction between institutions and behaviour. They determine: 
•  the intercept oa  or the initial stock of social capital necessary to 
influence the primary move away from predatory behaviour; 
•  the slope of the curve, which shows how strong the impact of 
institutional change will be on behaviour in particular society; and 
•  the point b, where a long period of institutional development has 
permitted behavioural patterns to emerge which could, in principle, 
approximate the assumptions of the rational choice paradigm adequately 
for the neo-classical theory to offer an acceptable description of reality. 
 
If we accept the plausibility of this hypothesis, it has significant implications for the way 
in which the process of development should be viewed and for the appropriate policy 
approaches that need to taken to promote sustainable economic growth. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa and countries of the former Soviet Union where institutional frameworks are weak 
and elite groups are small relative to the rest of the population, predatory action by the 
state will be the natural order of the day. On the other hand, in East Asia and Latin 
America where formal and informal rules of interaction have developed over long periods 
of time for the peaceful sharing of a countries wealth, and larger elite groups or middle 
classes have emerged, such predatory action is more likely to be constrained. There is 
clearly a threshold in each society where incentive structures develop to a point such that 
elite groups begin to find it more beneficial to modify their behaviour from being 
predatory to being more inclusive and socially productive. Consistent with the 
comparative history findings, this paper argues that the achievement of this threshold 
depends on the culture, beliefs, historical legacy, and accumulated social capital in a 
society. However, although historically, as in the case of Western Europe and North 
America, the process of reaching this point has tended to be evolutionary, the more recent 
20
th century experience suggests that there could be discontinuities in the trajectory of 
institutional development, with abrupt movements occurring in either a favourable or 
unfavourable direction. A favourable move such as occurred in India or Japan is shown in 
Figure 1 by a discontinuity which moves the society from point x to point y along the 
dotted lines. These discontinuities imply that there may be more non-deterministic and 
less path dependent ways of achieving higher levels of institutional development. 
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This perception of the dynamic interaction between basic human instincts, ideas and 
institutions, provides us with clues that are useful in explaining the different patterns of 
institutional change observed during the 20
th century. Our arguments suggest that while 
“rational” institutions can be introduced or imposed by an elite group, external force, or 
transitory event, their successful absorption and development is a more complex issue. 
The literature suggests that a favourable progression of discontinuities over time requires 
that social changes occur and social forces emerge whose presence reinforce the 
functioning of these very institutions. We have already noted the importance of the 
emergence of a middle class with its interest in the security of property and the rule of 
law (Easterly 2001). The role of education in promoting political development and 
rational choices, has been emphasized by Lipset (1960). Glaeser et al. (2004) empirically 
test Lipset’s view and find that for a sample of 71 countries, over the period 1950-80, 
schooling is a major causal factor explaining democratic institutions. Coleman (2000) and 
others have emphasized the catalytic role played by the initial stock of informal 
institutions or the reservoir of social capital available in a particular society. Considering 
these factors in the context of the four case studies discussed above, the key common 
element that emerges is that the elite groups, domestic or external, that brought about the 
initial institutional discontinuities, used their dominant position to ensure that the new 
frameworks and policies remained in place for a period of time long enough to facilitate 
the necessary social and behavioural changes which would underpin these very 
institutions. In India and Botswana, the domestic elite group supported progressive 
institutions and implemented policies favourable to the security of property rights. In 
Japan, the external occupying force did much the same thing, while demolishing the 
feudal system and allowing the growth of an indigenous middle class. Thus over time, as 
happened in Western Europe, the institutions became self-enforcing through the 
expansion of education, the development of a middle class, an increase in social capital, 
and associated changes in ideas, beliefs and behaviour.   
 
Using this model, and the reinforcing factors mentioned above, it is easy to understand 
the failure of institutional development in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the time of 
independence, African countries did not have a middle class, they had low levels of 
education, and given the dominance of tribal structures, they had inadequate reserves of 
social capital to support the requirements of a modern state. In comparison to the 
situation in our four case study countries, the elites in power were motivated by predatory 
tendencies, which eventually resulted in the establishment of neo-patrimonial states. One 
significant difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and countries of the near and far east, 
is that the latter group, which includes Japan, India, the countries of East Asia, and 
Turkey, are old civilizations with reserves of social capital that have accumulated and 
deepened over more than a thousand years. These reserves, rather than forming a barrier 
as suggested by some analysts, probably facilitated the absorption of new and more 
complex institutions. A caveat to this argument is that it has difficulty in explaining the 
institutional failure observed in the former Soviet Union. This part of the world shares 
much of the long history and culture of Europe. It would therefore seem reasonable to 
expect similar responses from many of the countries of the former Soviet Union, as from 
other western societies. One possible explanation, which is consistent with the idea of 
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transitory events causing discontinuities in institutional development, is that 70 years 
(almost two generations) of communist rule based on predatory and opportunistic modes 
of behaviour debilitated the traditional conventions, norms and beliefs to such an extent 
that the social capital accumulated over centuries was effectively wiped out. A direct 
consequence of this institutional destruction was that the behaviour of elite groups, and 
the state, in these transition economies reverted to their natural predatory forms. This 
notion is supported by Taylor (1982), who argues that the coercive power of the state can 
destroy community norms and altruistic behaviour. Coleman (1990) also argues that the 
expansion of the bureaucratic organization of the state can lead to the atrophy of informal 
networks, thereby diminishing social capital. 
 
We have argued that institutional change favourable to sustainable development can be 
brought about by an elite domestic group or external force. While domestic solutions are 
clearly a preferred mechanism to external interventions, their success requires that there 
be domestic forces powerful enough and motivated to bring about radical change. As it 
happens, the evidence on the persistence of institutional and poverty traps in large parts 
of the developing world, indicates that this is actually not the case. In the same way 
therefore, that an “exogenous” government intervention may be necessary to eliminate a 
bad equilibrium in domestic economic markets, international intervention may be the 
only way to move a country stuck in a low-level institutional trap, on to a path of 
sustained growth. The increasing legitimacy of modern systems that guarantee economic 
and political freedoms, the globalization of values that emerge out of these systems, and 
the subordination of local culture and beliefs, reinforce the view that successful 
institutional change cannot be an agenda which is left to domestic groups operating 
within a nation state. Rather, it can be argued that the elaboration of pre-designed 
institutional frameworks or templates which embody democratic and capitalist values, 
and efforts to implant them, albeit with local variations in form, into the developing 
world is a meaningful strategy to accelerate the process of economic development. 
 
Rodrik (1999) elaborating on how the institutions of a market-based system can be 
acquired, states that there are two options which can be followed. Firstly, institutional 
blue prints can be imported from successful economies. Secondly, if it believed that local 
conditions are so specific, then unique solutions based on local knowledge may be 
required. This juxtaposition is however, extreme because although capitalism in the US 
maybe be different in certain respects from that in Japan or Europe, certain fundamental 
characteristics are common. These include the security of property rights, legal systems 
to protect these rights, the rule of law, a reasonably efficient bureaucracy, the absence of 
corruption, political structures which permit the peaceful management of social conflict, 
etc. Of course, local history, custom and culture will undoubtedly influence the exact 
character of the institutions that emerge. However, to argue that countries have such a 
high degree of specificity that that they require unique institutions goes against the 
empirical evidence presented earlier on the deep determinants of economic growth.  The 
borrowing of market and non-market institutions which have proven to be historically 
successful, is therefore a good starting point for any country. Institutional development in 
this scenario would become a composite of local evolutionary tendencies, if any, and 
international models, supported by international action where necessary, to accelerate the 
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achievement of levels of economic and political governance which are more favorably 
disposed to productive behavior and productive activities. Such a process would be 
further aided and abetted by the present international political environment, which is 
increasingly hostile to elite groups acting in a predatory manner within the confines of 
their own borders. The recent institutional history of Southern Sudan, outlined below, 
represents just such a case where the theory elaborated above has been put into practice. 
 




Southern Sudan consists of the three provinces of Sudan that were defined as the 
Southern Region during the colonial period, prior to independence in 1956. The region 
has a population of about 12 million, with an African-Christian-Animist majority, in 
contrast to the northern provinces of Sudan, which are primarily Arab and Muslim. 
Although the south has several distinct tribal groups, the two major tribes are the Dinka 
and the Nuer, who ethnically form part of the River Lake Nilotic peoples of East Africa. 
To have a proper understanding of the underlying institutional setting of this pastoralist 
society, it is first necessary to consider its tribal political organization. The discussion 
presented below is based on the research that E.E. Evans Pritchard undertook on the Nuer 
in the 1930s (Evans-Pritchard, 1941). However, other ethnographic sources have also 
been consulted such as Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1970), and Lienhardt (1958), and on 
this basis it has been found that Evans-Pritchard’s analysis is equally applicable to the 
Dinka, who in effect are the tribal “cousins” of the Nuer. 
 
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940), in their study of eight primitive African societies 
conclude that the Nuer were part of that group of societies which lacked centralized 
authority, administrative machinery, and a constituted set of judicial institutions in which 
there were sharp divisions of rank, status or wealth. The Nuer, and other African tribes 
similar to them, therefore formed a group which could be classified as stateless societies. 
In the absence of an over-arching hierarchical political authority, the social structure was 
based on kinship, with linkages between clans being provided through a system of 
segmentary lineage. This lineage structure provided the framework of the political system 
and governed relations between independent clans who controlled their own territorial 
segments. The role of chiefs in this system, whether they had ritualistic authority like the 
leopard skin chief (fishing spear chiefs in the case of the Dinka), or had been given 
official status as part of government structures, was to play a mediating role along with 
elders or influential members of aristocratic clans, in resolving disputes based on 
established conventions. The constitution of Nilotic tribes was therefore highly 
individualistic and libertarian, with the absence of bureaucracy or any form of centralized 
government in their political structures. This was best termed as a system of “ordered 
anarchy” (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940 p.296) 
 
In spite of the severe dislocations during the civil war, the social and political structures 
described above have persisted in more or less their original forms up to today. These 
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structures therefore provide the underlying setting and context in which subsequent 
changes in the institutional framework of Southern Sudan need to be viewed. 
 
Institutions during the Civil War 
 
The civil war between the north and the south commenced around the time of 
independence in 1956, and continued intermittently for a period of 50 years, until the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005. Over two million 
people, mainly from the south, died during the conflict. The fundamental division 
between the north and the south was well recognised in colonial times. After the 
departure of the Egyptian intermediaries who were part of the civil administration of 
Sudan in the late 1920s, the British instituted their own Native Administration policy. 
One of the principal elements of this policy was to administer the south as a separate 
entity from the north, with measures in place to prevent the spread of Islam and Arab 
influence in the south. Thus the Closed Districts Ordinance was promulgated in 1930 
under which a stringent system of permits was made a requirement for any northerner or 
person of Egyptian origin wishing to enter the south. 
 
Discontent in the south with the manner in which the independence process was evolving, 
in particular increased fears of northern domination and colonization, led to the Torit 
Mutiny in 1955. Soldiers of the Southern Equatoria Corps killed their northern officers 
and fled into the bush. The rebellion emerged as the Anyanya (snake venom) secessionist 
movement in the early 1960s. Unable to suppress the movement, the Khartoum regime 
under Gen. Numeiri negotiated with southern political leaders, resulting in the Addis 
Ababa Agreement of 1972. Under the agreement, the three southern provinces were 
brought into a new self-governing Southern Sudanese Region, with a Regional Assembly 
of 60 members, and a High Executive Council. The Regional Assembly was empowered 
to elect or remove the President of the High Executive Council, subject to confirmation 
by the President of the Republic. The first elections to the Assembly were held in 1973. 
The Regional Government was to have control over health, education, mineral and 
natural resources, and the police. 
 
Resettlement and rehabilitation of the population displaced by the civil war between 1956 
and 1972, the absence of any investment from the central government, in-fighting within 
the southern political leadership, and the continuation of a low level guerrilla war by 
elements of the Anyanya who refused to accept the Addis Ababa agreement, resulted in 
ineffective administration and poor governance in the south during the decade following 
the establishment of the Southern Regional Government. In any event, based on the 
native administration system left behind by the colonial rulers, tribal structures continued 
to dominate the rural areas, with basic civil administration systems existing in only in 
Juba, the capital, and other major urban areas.  By the early 1980s, the Addis Ababa 
agreement had itself begun to look shaky, with Numeiri’s wavering commitment to its 
provisions, in particular his efforts to abolish the southern regional government and re-
divide the south. In mid-1983, dissatisfaction with Numeiri’s policies resulted in major 
mutinies and desertions of soldiers from several garrisons across the south. These forces 
soon unified with remnants of the earlier secessionist movement, and formed the Sudan 
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People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) under the leadership of Col. John 
Garang. A new phase of the civil war had begun, which ended only 22 years later with 
the signing of the CPA in 2005. 
 
During the course of the civil war the SPLM/A gained control over most of the rural 
areas. The SPLA divided the south into a number of areas or zones, which were put under 
Military/Civil Administrators and Commanders. At the local level the tribal structures, 
particularly the role of the chiefs in settling conflicts based on customary law, was 
reinforced. After the first National Convention in 1994, the SPLM began a limited 
process of separating military and civilian structures. The Civil Administration of New 
Sudan (CANS) was set up to administer a new hierarchy of rural civil administration. 
Within this framework, a number of administrative secretariats were set up, such as for 
finance, health, education, legal affairs and local government. However, these secretariats 
remained rudimentary and with limited personnel up to the end of the war. Given the 
fluid nature of the conflict, military structures continued to dominate the movement 
throughout the period. In terms of a formal legal framework, the SPLM did adopt a small 
number of civil and criminal laws in the last days of the civil war. These laws were either 
borrowed from the north, or based on earlier colonial laws. In any case, in the absence of 
an established judicial structure, they had very little applicability in practice. 
 
The northern government, on the other hand, continued to control Juba, the capital of the 
south, and a few other major towns. After the abolition of the Southern Regional 
Government in 1983, the south was re-divided into a number of smaller provinces. 
Provincial administrations, based on the old colonial bureaucratic model, with ministries 
staffed by under secretaries, deputy secretaries, clerks and messengers, were established 
in each province. Since the northern government did not have physical control over the 
provinces, the purpose was primarily political rather than to actually provide a proper 
civil administration. As a consequence, the provincial administrative structures were 
housed in the few military garrison towns under the control of the north apart from 
undertaking police, judicial and law enforcement functions, did little else. Since the 
population and provincial administrations in the garrison towns were under the control of 
the government in Khartoum, the laws and legal structures governing them were those of 
the north, as well, i.e. based on the Shari’a. 
 
At the beginning of 2005 therefore, the institutional and governance frameworks in 
Southern Sudan were fragmented and fragile. The civil administration was divided 
between rudimentary structures in the SPLM controlled areas, and an unknown number 
of police, judicial, law enforcement, and relatively low-skilled personnel in the northern 
controlled garrison towns. The limited social services being received by the population 
were being provided by international NGOs, funded by donor organizations. There was 
no constitution. The legal framework consisted of a small number of laws that had been 
approved by the SPLM Leadership Council. The SPLM itself was the only legitimate 
political force, with almost all the other political groupings operating as armed militias. 
These militias tended to have control over their own areas or territories. Although there 
was a formal distinction between the SPLM and the SPLA, in practice it was the senior 
commanders of the guerrilla army who controlled the Leadership Council of the 
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movement. Finally, after all these years of civil war there were very few indigenous civil 
society organizations, media coverage or information dissemination systems, to speak of 
in Southern Sudan   
 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
 
The CPA (Government of Southern Sudan, 2005a) was the product of negotiations 
between the two main protagonists in the civil war: the government in Khartoum led by 
the National Congress Party (NCP) and the rebels in the south led by the SPLM. The 
negotiations were mediated by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), a grouping which included the UN, AU, and interested developed and 
developing nations. The Power Sharing Protocol (IGAD, Kenya, 2004) of the CPA 
contains the most wide-ranging effort to provide southern Sudan with a formal 
institutional framework, in its history. Since the structures contained in the protocol have 
had an important influence on the direction of institutional development in the south, it is 
necessary to fully describe and analyse its content. 
 
Under the CPA, Southern Sudan was to establish its own autonomous government – the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), using a model of asymmetric federalism, with 
the possibility of secession through a referendum after a 6 year Interim period. One of the 
consequences of having fought a brutal dictatorial regime, and having had the strong 
support of western democratic countries during the latter part of the liberation struggle, 
was that the leadership of the SPLM had made their commitment to the creation of a 
democratic society based on the protection of human rights and the rule of law, well 
known. This commitment was reflected in the Power Sharing Protocol, which stated that 
its underlying principles were good governance, transparency, the rule of law and 
democracy. Thus it was agreed that human rights should be protected in accordance with 
international conventions and treaties; that there should be the right to liberty, right to fair 
trial, protection against arbitrary arrest or detention, freedom of expression, thought and 
religion; and, the right to peaceful assembly. Further, there should be fair electoral laws, 
the free establishment of political parties, and elections at all levels of government, with 
the first general elections being held four years after the signing of the CPA. Finally, a 
decentralized system of government was to be established with significant devolution of 
powers to the states. 
 
Southern Sudan was to have its own constitution, which embodied all these principles. In 
terms of the actual sharing of power prior to the general election, it was agreed that at the 
level of the national government in Khartoum, the allocation of seats in the legislature 
would be: NCP – 52%, SPLM – 28%, other northern and southern political forces – 20%. 
The same proportion would govern the allocation of ministerial portfolios in the National 
Council of Ministers. In the southern Legislative Assembly, the representation of the 
various parties was to be SPLM – 70%, NCP – 15%, other southern parties – 15%. 
Similar portions would hold for the allocation of portfolios in the Southern Sudan 
Council of Ministers. All the southern states were to have their own constitutions and 
legislative assemblies. The Power Sharing Protocol also defined the exclusive 
competencies of the three major levels of government. The National government in 
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Khartoum, had exclusive control over defence, foreign affairs, immigration, customs, 
currency and monetary policy. The Government of Southern Sudan could maintain a 
security apparatus and military in accordance with the provisions of the CPA, implement 
taxes and raise revenues to finance its own budget, establish a GOSS civil service, and 
undertake the planning and coordination of social services in the southern region. The ten 
State governments in the south could establish their own civil services, oversee local 
government structures, provide social services, and undertake local taxation to raise 
revenues for local expenditures. 
 
Democracy and Governance (DG) Program 
 
In the analysis that follows, we shall consider how the provisions of the CPA, and 
external interventions, primarily under the auspices of the U.S. Government’s Democracy 
and Governance Program, have affected the institutional trajectory of Southern Sudan 
since 2005. In the north, the regime continues to be dominated by a military dictatorship 
which is intent on a genocidal campaign in Darfur. Consequently, the provisions of the 
CPA have had little impact. However, in the southern region, the willingness and interest 
of the southern military/political elite to create a more open society, has created a 
different set of circumstances. Here it has been possible for external forces to engage the 
internal leadership in the establishment of institutional structures, which could contribute 
to the creation of a more open and democratic society. The main initiative in the program 
has come from the United States. Although many of the leading western nations had been 
involved in the IGAD-led peace process and the CPA itself, because of issues relating to 
the sovereignty of Sudan as a whole, these countries have been hesitant to engage 
separately with the SPLM in the south to facilitate the creation of new institutions. The 
U.S. Government, on the other hand, has not had any such hesitations because the 
northern regime has been seen as a sponsor of terrorism, and support for the SPLM has 
been part of U.S. foreign policy for some time. Further, activities to support the 
promotion of democracy and good governance in developing countries have been an 
integral part of the USAID program for a long time, accounting for about 15% of its 
global budget in recent years. 
 
As a consequence of this policy stand, the U.S. Government fielded a Democracy and 
Governance team to visit Southern Sudan in mid-2004. The objective of the exercise was 
to engage the leadership of the SPLM in consultations that would result in the design of a 
program of wide-ranging and deep institutional interventions. The program was also to be 
consistent with the provisions of the CPA. The team’s view was that Southern Sudan was 
at a crossroads. A historical window of opportunity existed to build a new Southern 
Sudan based on principles of democratic governance. However, if this opportunity were 
not grasped, there was a strong likelihood that the region would fall into the usual African 
pattern of authoritarian government, with mismanagement and poor governance. Worse 
still, the possibility existed for the region to go through a process, as had occurred in 
neighbouring Somalia, where the lack of a legitimate governance framework had led to 
the spread of warlord-ism and the accompanying socio-political disintegration. The 
discussions with the SPLM leadership therefore, were based on the ideas of open and 
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inclusive governance systems, and the creation of new structures of government that were 
transparent, accountable and capable of delivering services to the people.  
 
In developing the proposed program, two key characteristics of Southern Sudan’s 
traditional political structure - the libertarian and individualistic culture of the people, and 
the fact that the region was effectively starting with a tabula rasa of formal institutions, 
were kept in mind. Both factors encouraged the DG team to translate the provisions of the 
CPA into bold proposals for democratic governance. The specific elements of the 
program were: 
 
•  to provide expert inputs and facilitation for the preparation of a democratic 
constitution which enshrined a separation of powers, guaranteed civil liberties, 
and met international standards; 
•  to provide wide-ranging technical assistance for the establishment of responsive 
central institutions in the Executive, along with transparent and accountable 
systems of government; 
•  to assist the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to transform itself 
from a rebel movement to a democratic political party; 
•  to provide funding and other support which would encourage the development of 
a non-governmental sector that worked across ethnic, social and regional lines; 
and finally, 
•  to assist in the design and fund a program which would increase access to public 
information and facilitate the growth of an independent media sector. 
 
All these elements were discussed in detail with the SPLM leadership, and the 
implementation of the agreed program commenced in early 2005. The major 
interventions undertaken under the DG program, and any observable influence that the 
institutional structures put in place may have had on the socio-economic context or 




The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (Government of Southern Sudan, 2005b) is 
primarily based on the principles and provisions contained in the Power Sharing Protocol 
of the CPA. Thus the clauses relating to the protection of human rights, civil liberties, 
establishment of political parties, free and fair elections, and judicial independence are 
drawn from there. Since the representation of different political parties in the new South 
Sudan Assembly had been agreed to as part of the CPA, the existence of a multi-party 
system was already a foregone conclusion. The establishment of a decentralized system of 
government, with a significant devolution of powers was also part of this agreement. 
However, on a range of other issues such as the protection of property rights; separation 
of powers between the executive and other branches of government; limitations on the 
powers of the President and his terms of office; oversight powers of the legislature; the 
relative powers of the federal versus state governments; and, the extent of judicial 
independence, the content of the constitutional provisions still had to be agreed upon, and 
it was by no means evident what the final conclusion would be. The drafting committee 
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for the Constitution, and political leaders involved in this process, were individuals from 
varied backgrounds with differing views. There were human rights lawyers from the 
South Sudan Law Society who ardently believed in the protection of civil liberties. Some 
political leaders believed that to accommodate the diversity of tribal groupings in the 
south and prevent domination by any major southern tribe, the state governments should 
be given considerable autonomy and powers. Others, who were closer to the SPLM 
leadership and more concerned about security and control issues, argued for less 
federalism and a greater centralization of powers.  
 
In this complex arena, the DG program played an important catalytic role in bringing 
about consensus in the drafting process that led to the Constitution. Members of the 
constitution committee, and senior leaders from the SPLM and other political parties, 
were exposed to resource materials and a number of draft documents which reflected 
alternative possibilities and international best practice. Numerous private discussions 
were held between experts and the SPLM leadership about the authoritarian tendencies of 
many African governments, how this had contributed to the malaise on the continent, and 
why a democratic constitution was needed to repair the dislocation and disintegration 
caused by the long running civil war, and to encourage the emergence of an inclusive and 
participatory society. The eventual draft Constitution that the southern Sudanese 
themselves came up with can only be termed as exemplary for a war torn society with no 
tradition of democratic governance. The draft had a number of standard elements found in 
other countries such as a Bill of Rights; limitation of the Presidential term to two terms; 
and, separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. It clearly 
specified the right to own property as a fundamental right, and that no expropriation could 
occur save through the due process of the law, and then in return for fair compensation. 
However, it also went well beyond the CPA in a number of respects. Judicial 
independence was strengthened by the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the 
Legislature for the removal of justices of the Supreme Court. Further, unlike in many 
other countries where the judiciary is under the financial control of a parent ministry in 
the Executive, the draft Constitution proposed that the judiciary have the right to prepare 
its own budgets and manage its own financial affairs. 
 
The proposed draft also reinforced the vision of a federal system of government, as 
contained in the CPA. The states within the federal system were to have their own 
constitutions and legislative bodies, with considerable devolution of administrative 
powers. These included the appointment and control of state civil services, oversight of 
all local government institutions within the state, the management and provision of all 
social services, and the ability to raise local taxes to finance the state budget. That the 
draft Constitution was contentious and probably seen as being too “democratic” or 
promoting too much “federalism” by some important members of the political leadership, 
is shown by the fact that for many months after its preparation it was neither debated nor 
placed before the Leadership Council of the SPLM. The draft only came into the public 
domain after the death of Dr. John Garang, the Chairman of the SPLM/A, in August 
2005, and it was adopted by the SPLM and the Legislative Assembly soon after. 
Although it is hard to predict how the Interim Constitution will influence the evolution of 
the institutions of governance in Southern Sudan, the discussion below which covers 2006 
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and 2007, is indicative of the manner in which various institutional structures are 
performing, and is suggestive that the greater dispersion of political power enshrined in 
the Constitution is likely to result in a more participatory and democratic form of 




Under the CPA, Southern Sudan was to have a Presidential system of government. As 
indicated in the discussion above however, the provisions of the Interim Constitution 
have limited the powers of the Executive in various ways as compared with other 
presidential systems. In particular, a greater oversight role has been given to the 
Legislature, and the Judiciary has been given the constitutional basis for playing a 
potentially more independent role. In early 2005, the Governance Cluster of the SPLM, 
under the chairmanship of Dr. Riak Machar (later Vice-President of Southern Sudan), 
began the effort of going beyond the rudimentary civil administration structures of the 
civil war and defining a fully-fledged Executive. The Governance Cluster proposed that 
the GOSS should have 21 Ministries and central institutions. Its report (Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Movement, 2005), however, did not provide any further elaboration of the 
powers, structures, or the size of the proposed institutions. It also made no comment 
about the old civil service structures in Juba and the other garrison towns controlled by 
the northern regime. Subsequent to the formal establishment of GOSS in July 2005, the 
SPLM gained control over these latter areas. This gave them access for the first time 
since the early 1980s to the southern administrative structures, which had been under the 
control of the northern government. 
 
To facilitate the integration of the two civil services, and rebuild government structures 
within the new vision of the CPA and Interim Constitution, as an initial step, the DG 
program supported an exercise to carry out a head count of personnel both from the 
SPLM and previously northern controlled areas. The results of the survey came as a 
surprise to all concerned. It was found that there were around 55,000 technical and 
administrative personnel. However, it was also estimated that there were an additional 
90,000 or so unskilled staff on the payroll of the old civil administration. This gave a total 
of about 145,000 personnel on the ground. Most of these employees, particularly the 
unskilled staff, were part of the provincial/state administrations being maintained in the 
south by the northern regime. Faced by this bloated bureaucracy, the leadership of the 
incipient southern government felt that at this early stage in their efforts to gain 
legitimacy and control over the southern region, it was not politically viable to lay off 
thousands of workers. Although maintaining so many personnel would result in a heavy 
financial burden, given the volatile situation, lay offs were not implemented because it 
was felt that this could quite easily lead to civil unrest in the urban areas. As a way out of 
this political dilemma, the view was taken that since most of these personnel would in 
due course become employees of the ten new state governments soon to be set up, this 
problem could be dealt with by these governments and their legislatures, once they had 
been constituted. The more critical and immediate issue was to create a coherent structure 
of government and civil service at the Southern Sudan federal level: one that would 
permit effective governance and the immediate delivery of services to the people. 
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In consonance with this SPLM decision, in late 2005, the DG team designed and began 
the implementation of a major program to build the required governmental structures and 
new decision-making systems. In view of the vast task of creating new structures, in 
some cases from scratch, it was decided to focus on the few central institutions that have 
a major influence on the performance of government. The organizations chosen were the 
Ministries of Finance, Public Service, Legal Affairs, Information, and the Bank of 
Southern Sudan. In addition, the centre of government – the Offices of the President, 
Vice-President, Presidential Advisors, and the Council of Ministers, were targeted for 
assistance in developing mandates, job descriptions, and coherent inter-related 
organizational structures. The confines and the purpose of this paper do not permit a 
detailed discussion of all the institutional development activities undertaken by the DG 
program. Therefore, the discussion below only focuses on improved decision-making at 
the apex level of government. This is because organizations at the centre of government 
are key to the functioning of the Executive, the policies that emerge from decision-
making here affect the socio-economic variables in the region, and their performance is 
more likely to influence the trajectory of other institutions. 
 
There were two principles underlying the interventions of the DG program at the centre 
of government. Firstly, given the objective of the new government to bring together the 
various fractious tribal, militia, and other political elements under one Southern Sudanese 
umbrella, it was necessary to develop structures and systems which would promote 
consultation, cohesiveness and consensus. Secondly, during the war, practically no 
developmental activities had taken place, nor had any basic social services been provided 
to the people. Thus to strengthen the legitimacy of the new government in the eyes of the 
people, it was essential to set up mechanisms which ensured that good policy priorities 
were adopted at the highest level that enabled the implementation of such developmental 
programs. Four examples are discussed below to show that the structures, systems and 
procedures being put in place are in fact facilitating the emergence of responsive, 
priority-based, and unified collective decision-making systems in the government. 
 
Council of Minister’s decision-making procedures: By late 2005, most of the 
ministerial and other senior appointments of the GOSS had been completed. At that time, 
meetings of the Council of Ministers (COM) were undertaken in a manner similar to that 
of the earlier Leadership Council of the SPLM i.e. ad hoc meetings without any fixed 
agenda. The Minister for Cabinet Affairs once complained that several hours of a Cabinet 
meeting had been taken up in discussions on the status of toilets attached to Minister’s 
offices. This situation was soon remedied through interventions supported by the DG 
program. A regular time table for meetings; a proper set of procedures with formats for 
the receipt, review, prioritization and discussion of proposals; and, requirements for 
follow-up and reporting, were introduced. A COM Handbook (Government of Southern 
Sudan, 2006a) was prepared so that Ministers and other senior officials could easily 
familiarize themselves and refer to the requirements of the new system. These procedures 
have been adhered to and improved upon by the Cabinet Office since 2006, leading to 
priority-based and more effective decision-making at the apex of government. 
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Budgetary resources: South Sudan’s budgetary resources are based on the Oil Sharing 
Agreement of the CPA. Although the precise manner in which the north undertakes the 
estimation and valuation of the oil proceeds is a contentious issue, since early 2005, the 
revenue flows to the south have amounted to about US$1 billion per annum. Revenues 
from other sources such as taxes and duties have been negligible. South Sudan’s budget 
has therefore been based on its oil revenue share plus any proceeds received from 
external assistance flows. By late 2005, the appointment of leaders from the SPLM and 
other parties to Ministerial and senior positions in the government had been completed. 
2006 therefore, was the first year when the political leadership of the south had access to 
substantial financial resources. In normal functioning systems, all ministries and 
government agencies get their funding through budgetary allocations. Thus the new 
Ministry of Finance of the GOSS, in its normal capacity in early 2006, began the usual 
budgetary exercise of allocating resources based on the priorities of the government. 
Many in the political leadership however, did not see the Ministry’s budgetary efforts as 
being the best way of allocating and accessing resources. In the absence of an over-
arching vision of government in Southern Sudan, they saw themselves as the 
representatives of the various tribes, regions, and political groupings of the south. To 
them therefore, this was an opportunity to grab something for their constituents from the 
common pool of resources. The lack of unified collective decision-making systems 
exacerbated this common pool problem, and led to individual government agencies 
signing up agreements and contracts for infrastructure development, the delivery of 
goods, and the provision of services, for their respective constituents and areas. Within a 
short period of time the contracts signed up in this manner added up to almost US$1 
billion or the equivalent of the total budgetary resources available to the GOSS for the 
full 2006 financial year. 
 
While the financial disruption caused by this event is in the process of being reviewed 
and resolved by the GOSS, to prevent the recurrence of this problem, the DG program 
and other donors took immediate steps. A quick assessment of the financial implications 
of all the contracts signed was made and submitted to the Council of Ministers, with the 
recommendation that the authority of Ministers to make financial commitments on behalf 
of government without approval from Cabinet be taken away from them. In conjunction 
with this, new procurement guidelines and procedures were quickly put in place at the 
apex level of decision-making. These, and the improved collective decision-making 
systems for the Council of Ministers discussed above, have prevented a re-emergence of 
this phenomenon in 2007. During the current year, it has been observed that approval of 
the Council of Ministers is being sought before any significant contracts are signed, and 
government agencies are doing their contracting and the procurement of goods and 
services more or less based on their budgetary allocations. 
 
The 200-Day Action Plan: The third example of the catalytic role that the DG program 
played relates to strengthening the legitimacy of government. When the GOSS was 
formed in mid-2005, it had no concrete plan of activities for the socio-economic 
development of the region. A very broad, donor dependent framework, had been put 
together by the Joint Assessment Mission (United Nations, 2004), but this was of little 
use in terms of defining immediate and specific priority activities. In the circumstances, 
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the DG program introduced the concept of an Action Plan to the Office of the President 
(200-Day Action Plan, Office of the President, Government of Southern Sudan, 2006b). 
The idea was that all agencies of government should prepare a brief list of priority policy 
actions, institutional reform measures, improvements in service delivery, projects and 
programs, which they could feasibly commit themselves to being completed within a 
time bound period. This program of action could then be monitored by the Presidency, 
with all government agencies providing regular progress reports. With support from the 
DG program, the exercise was completed within a very short period of time, and the 
document was released by the President to the Legislative Assembly in August 2006. 
Since the plan had commitment from the highest level, it galvanized the government into 
taking decisions, formulating enabling policies, rehabilitating or building new 
infrastructure, and delivering basic services to the people, wherever feasible. The Action 
Plan has now been institutionalized within the government as an instrument to encourage 
the practical planning and implementation of activities, projects and programs. In the first 
review that was undertaken in January 2007, it was found that out of the 483 actions 
proposed under the Plan, 263 activities or over half, had either been completed or were 
on track.  
 
Corruption:  The large literature on corruption shows that this phenomenon can 
undermine the workings of an open political system and prevent a country from achieving 
sustainable development. With this in view, the DG program, and other donors such as 
the World Bank, encouraged the political leadership to adopt transparent and well-
designed government-wide procurement procedures and regulations, including the setting 
up of a strong Anti-Corruption Commission. The Commission was set up in mid 2006. 
Since then, it has been receiving support from the DG program to strengthen its 
institutional capacity and technical expertise. As a consequence of donor emphasis on this 
area, and increasing awareness in the Council of Ministers about the importance of this 
issue, fighting corruption has already developed a very high profile in Southern Sudan. 
Towards the end of 2006, four senior civil servants were dismissed for following 
improper procurement procedures and other alleged corrupt activities. Subsequent to this, 
a Presidential Commission was appointed to review all contracts signed by the 
government since its formation in mid 2005. In early 2007, the Minister of Finance was 
removed from office because of serious allegations of corruption. More recently, as part 
of a Cabinet reshuffle undertaken in mid-2007, the powerful Minister of Roads and 
Transport was moved to a non-ministerial advisory position, and the portfolio of the 
Ministry of Housing was taken away from the Vice-President, due to complaints about 
improprieties in contracting and procurement procedures. From these incidents, it is 
evident that support from the DG program, and the role played by donors such as the 
World Bank, have made an important contribution to developing an anti-corruption ethic 




In consonance with the principle of a separation of powers, the Interim Constitution gives 
the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) a strong role in the structure of 
governance. The Assembly’s significant functions include approving the laws of the land 
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and enacting other enabling legislation; approving the plans, programs, policies and 
budget of the GOSS; overseeing the performance of the Executive and summoning 
Ministers, as required: and, having the power to impeach the President, in certain 
circumstances. Apart from these normal oversight functions, the Constitution gives the 
SSLA some innovative powers. Firstly, it has the role of regulating the terms and 
conditions of service of the Judiciary. This is an important function, which by 
strengthening the position of the Judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive increases the 
dispersion of political power between the various arms of government. Secondly, to 
strengthen the concept of multi-partyism and increase the respect of the party in power 
for the political opposition, the Constitution gives the Leader of the Opposition in the 
SSLA a high constitutional status. This position has been included in the official 
hierarchy of the State and is ranked fourth in terms of precedence after the President, 
Vice-President and Speaker. As can be seen from these provisions, the powers of the 
Legislature go well beyond what may have been envisaged in the CPA. 
 
After the formation of the GOSS in July 2005, and with the elections not to occur before 
2009, the first members of the SSLA were chosen through a two-step process. This 
involved public input through gatherings that were held in each of the 200 or so 
Assembly constituencies in Southern Sudan. In the gatherings, which were attended by 
the general public, tribal elders, activists from political parties and civic groups, there was 
much debate and discussion, and finally one candidate was selected through consensus. 
These candidates were then vetted by the leadership of various political parties, and 
appointed as members of the Assembly. As envisaged in the CPA, 70% of the members 
were from the SPLM, with the balance being southerners representing other political 
parties such as the NCP, USAP, SSDF, etc. A survey of the background of these 
members shows that about 50% had been part of the civil service or administrative 
apparatus during the civil war, 25% are from the teaching or related professions, and a 
further 25% have a background in business or the private sector. Thus when the SSLA 
was first convened in 2006, almost none of its members had any legislative experience or 
were clear about the constitutional role of the Assembly. 
 
Faced with this situation, the DG team put in place an intensive program of discussions 
with legislators to explain the Constitution, and train them in their legislative and 
oversight functions. Support was also provided to the Speaker to set up a number of 
committees of the legislature. These include a Legal Committee to review draft laws and 
other legislation, and a Finance Committee to oversee the government’s economic 
policies, programs, and annual budget. As a consequence of these interventions, the 
SSLA has begun to play an increasingly active role in Southern Sudan’s system of 
governance. Ministers have been repeatedly summoned to the Assembly to explain many 
of their actions. Both during 2006 and 2007, the Budget proposals of the Ministry of 
Finance were closely reviewed and a number of amendments made to the proposed 
pattern of expenditure. The Legal Committee has played a particularly active role in 
scrutinizing the key laws in the new legal framework being prepared by the Executive. In 
a number of cases the laws were returned to the Ministry of Legal Affairs because 
members felt that the provisions were not adequately explained or justified, or were 
incompatible with the democratic principles contained in the Constitution. At the 
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provincial level however, although the ten state assemblies have been constituted, they 
have not yet begun to play their appropriate role within the federal framework of the 
Constitution. 
 
The Legal Framework 
 
As stated earlier, until the establishment of the new government in mid-2005, Southern 
Sudan had a legal framework that had been derived from the northern regime in 
Khartoum. Many laws had their origins in colonial times. As a consequence, the few laws 
that were in place were repressive and not protective of civil liberties or human rights. 
Given the new Constitution, a major effort was started under the DG program to work 
with the Ministry of Legal Affairs in revising all these laws and to come up with a 
framework that was consistent with the new democratic dispensation. A total of about 40 
key laws were revised or drafted from scratch, during 2006 and 2007. The most 
significant laws that have been enacted so far include the Penal Code, the Criminal 
Procedures Code, the Civil Procedures Code, Law on Evidence, the Judiciary Act, the 
Police Act, and a Human Rights Act to enable a new independent commission to be set 
up. In addition, to promote transparency and accountability, an Anti-Corruption Act to 
support the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission, and an Auditor General’s 
Act, have also been drafted. All these laws are in various stages of approval and adoption 
by the government and legislature. 
 
In the preparation of these laws there was a constant debate between the DG team, the 
leaders of the SPLM, and senior officials dealing with legal issues in the GOSS. Many 
had genuine security concerns and felt that given the continuing threats from the regime 
in Khartoum, in particular, its efforts to de-stabilize the south through surrogates such as 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), it was risky at this stage to have laws which were too 
liberal or which restricted the powers of the state. In these debates the DG team would 
constantly argue that the answer to a dictatorial regime in the north was not to create an 
authoritarian legal framework in the south. Rather the focus should be to follow the 
principles of the CPA and adopt laws that contribute to the creation of a democratic 
society, with transparent and accountable systems in place. In most of these discussions, 
the DG team won the day. Thus many of the repressive elements of the pre-2005 laws, 
such as restrictions on the freedom of assembly, broad definition of what was considered 
subversive, the easy ability of the state to expropriate private property, etc., were in the 
main eliminated. One of the most significant achievements of the program has been to 
contribute to the creation of a new set of laws to promote an open media sector and 
freedom of information. This is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Media and Freedom of Information 
 
In a democratic society, a free press plays the dual role of keeping the public informed, 
while at the same time being part of the system of checks and balances on government. 
Consequently, activities to encourage the development of a free press and independent 
sources of information have been an integral part of the DG program from the beginning. 
Prior to the signing of the CPA, there was no independent media in Southern Sudan. At 
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the policy level therefore, the program facilitated thinking in the SPLM leadership 
towards implementing a system based on freedom of the press, and the establishment of 
private sector based media and broadcasting systems. At the practical level, from early 
2005, financial and technical support was provided for the establishment of an 
independent Sudan Radio Service and a newspaper called the Sudan Mirror. 
 
In 2006, these initial steps began to bear fruit. A close relationship developed between the 
DG team and the newly appointed Minister for Information. Consequently, with support 
from the program, the Ministry of Information commenced a process of designing a 
regulatory framework to support the establishment of an independent media sector and 
encourage freedom of information in Southern Sudan. Under this initiative, four major 
laws have been prepared so far: to establish an independent government broadcasting 
agency; to promote the right of access to official information; and, to encourage the 
establishment of self-regulatory mechanisms in the private sector. It is expected that these 
laws will be reviewed by the Council of Ministers, and approved by the SSLA, before the 
end of 2007. With this policy framework in place, a beginning has already been made 
towards the establishment of an independent media sector in Southern Sudan. Five new 
private radio broadcasters (two with donor support) have been set up. A new private 
weekly newspaper has started in Juba, the capital. Finally, to increase the access of the 
public to information, the DG program intends to distribute over 425,000 solar 
powered/wind up radios to primary schools, target audiences and listening groups all over 




During the civil war there was, and could be, little distinction between the Movement and 
the Army. However, with the coming of peace, democratic development required that 
there be a clear distinction between these two organizations, with the SPLM gradually 
moulding itself into a civilian political party. Too many liberations movements have in 
the past been unable to make this transition, resulting in the militarization of political 
structures and eventually leading to authoritarian modes of governance. Recent 
developments in Zimbabwe, particularly since 2000, are indicative of such tendencies and 
the dangers that newly independent African societies face in achieving democratic 
transitions. The DG program, in this respect, has played a significant role to date, helping 
the SPLM to develop an inclusive party constitution that represents the diverse views of 
its membership, with rules and procedures that attempt to institute democratic processes 
within the party. To facilitate this process, the program supported several consultative and 
plenary sessions amongst the leaders of the SPLM and party members to review its 1994 
constitution and come up with a new one that reflected its new status as a democratic 
political party. Draft party constitutions from a number of countries and the support of 
international experts were provided to encourage wide debate in the process of coming up 
with a new document. The current draft clearly outlines the role of the national 
convention in formalizing the decision- making and leadership structures of the party. The 
ground rules for elections within the party have also been set out. This draft has been 
endorsed by the SPLM leadership, and the expectation is that it will soon be ratified in a 
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party convention. On a parallel front the SPLA is re-organizing itself to become a 
conventional standing army, with a professional and independent structure of command. 
 
Under the DG program, assistance is not only being given to the SPLM to reorganize 
itself as a civilian political party, but significant support is also being given to all other 
major political groups in Southern Sudan. The objective is to enable them to strengthen 
their internal structures and function as effective organizations. Many of these political 
groups operated as independent militias during the civil war. These militias are being 
disbanded and integrated into the Army. In their place, a new civilian leadership 
consisting of members of the Legislative Assembly, tribal leaders, prominent returnees 
from the Diaspora, etc. is gradually taking over the reins. The focus of the DG program in 
this area has therefore, been to support the incipient and emergent civilian political 
structures and help them to develop into organizations which can represent and provide 
political leadership to their constituents. To strengthen the system of multi-party politics, 
the next stage of assistance under the DG program will be to support the establishment of 
electoral structures, in particular an independent Electoral Commission, whose authority 
is to be empowered under a strong electoral law. It is hoped to have all this in place 
before the first general elections are held in 2009. 
 
Institutional Development 2005-2007: Some Observations 
 
Three years is a very short period in the history of a country. However, in line with the 
thesis of institutional discontinuities presented in this paper, it is a period which is long 
enough for there to be a significant break from the past, and for the developments during 
this period to be a major influence on the future trajectory of institutions and governance. 
From the discussion above, we can clearly see that this has been the case in Southern 
Sudan. Fundamental changes in formal and informal institutions, rules, practices and 
modes of thinking have been introduced through an externally supported intervention that 
has worked closely with the domestic political elite, and the process is still ongoing. 
Although the democratic and federalist systems in place could be said to be in consonance 
with the individualistic and libertarian spirit of the Nilotic peoples, the structures of 
government being established move radically away from the traditional stateless society 
or “ordered anarchy” of Southern Sudan. Many of the problems faced by GOSS, such as 
the resistance to unified and centralized decision making structures at the apex of 
government and common pool problems in the use of government oil revenues, are a 
reflection of the conflict between traditional practices and modes of thinking, and the 
requirements of modern governance. Nevertheless, as has been outlined in the discussion, 
the new institutional structures are beginning to influence old habits and ways of thinking, 
and encourage the emergence of forms of behavior that are more consistent with the spirit 
of the new formal systems that have been put in place. 
 
This paper argues that the institutional development seen in Southern Sudan over the past 
three years has had the effect of putting in place the building blocks of an “open access” 
society. Events observed in a range of areas suggest that the new institutional framework 
is generating forces, which over time are likely to ensure that these very institutions will 
become self-enforcing. A summary of these events is given below: 
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•  A federal system, with constitutional protections and exclusive competencies for 
the states to prevent any central dominance has been put in place. The formation 
of the State Governor’s Forum during the past year shows how the forces 
favouring a decentralization of political authority are asserting themselves. The 
refusal of Bahr-el-Jebel State to hand over the territory of Juba to federal control 
so that it can become a centrally administered capital, is a good example of the 
inability of the federal government to brow beat state governments. 
•  In spite of having a Presidential system in an African context, the collective 
decision making systems in place at the apex of government have so far 
minimized unilateral decisions being taken by the President using temporary 
ordinances or residual powers. The Council of Ministers meets regularly, and 
decides on all major issues concerning government. Furthermore, the GOSS is not 
seen by the public as an over powering entity with a powerful President. For 
instance, by mutual consent, many of the mandates and responsibilities of the 
President (who is from the dominant Dinka tribe) have recently been handed over 
to the Vice-President (who is from the Nuer tribe). 
•  Oversight of the Executive is being undertaken by a number of constitutionally 
protected institutions with increasing vigour. In the past two years, members of 
the Legislative Assembly have become increasingly active in scrutinizing 
government actions. The Council of Ministers, Anti-Corruption Commission and 
the Auditor General’s Office, with support from the Presidency, have already 
made significant inroads into tackling corruption and encouraging financial 
probity in government. This is indicated by the dismissal of the Minister of 
Finance, and the divesting of portfolios with potentially lucrative rent-seeking 
possibilities, from two senior politicians.  
•  A regulatory framework, which encourages the development of a free and 
independent media sector, has been put in place, and the number of privately 
owned media outlets is increasing rapidly. 
•  The liberal economic policies and simple regulatory framework adopted by the 
government is bringing in a flood of private investment, particularly from the 
southern Sudanese Diaspora that had settled in the West during the long years of 
civil war. The return of an educated Diaspora into the business sector is likely to 
play an important role in facilitating the growth of an incipient middle class in 
Southern Sudan, with its attendant interest in reinforcing the security of property 
rights and the rule of law. 
•  Finally, due to the weakness of governmental structures, a significant proportion 
of the increased external resources that have flowed into Southern Sudan since the 
signing of the CPA, has gone into the non-governmental sector. This has resulted 
in the mushrooming growth of local NGOs, community-based and other grass-
roots organizations. Although, it is still very early days, this widespread expansion 
of civil society organizations can only bode well for a more inclusive and 
democratic pattern of society in Southern Sudan. 
 
After 50 years of civil war, Southern Sudan remains a fragile society. Disputes over the 
north-south boundary, sharing of oil wealth, etc. could lead to a new outbreak of fighting 
between the northern regime and the south. The society is still highly militarized, with the 
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integration of tribal militias into a unified professional army being incomplete. Surrogate 
militias, which operate on behalf of the north still continue to function. Although there 
has been a formal separation between the military and civilian structures of the SPLM, 
ex-military commanders hold many of the senior positions within the hierarchy of 
government. The SPLM itself continues to be the dominant force in the south. Thus there 
is much that can quite easily destabilize and reverse the gains in democratic governance 
that have been achieved over the past few years. As against this, the President and his 
inner team of advisors remain committed to the development of an inclusive and open 
society. External forces in the form of the U.S. and Western governments, multilateral 
agencies such as the World Bank and U.N. (including about 15,000 peace-keepers), now 
have a considerable and wide-ranging presence in the south. This is likely to be a 
stabilizing influence and one that will continue to encourage the southern elites to pursue 
their path of democratic development. The future is therefore uncertain. However, there is 
little doubt that huge strides have been made in implementing and establishing more 
efficient institutions and policies in Southern Sudan. In this process, interventions under 
USAID’s Democracy and Governance Program have played a catalytic and central role.  
 
III.   Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have shown that the weight of evidence supports the proposition that 
institutions, rather than resources, are central to developmental outcomes, Further, we 
have argued that in context of the non-western world, societies do not have the necessary 
social forces or behavioural characteristics to ensure that institutions which encourage 
good economic and political governance will emerge in a gradual evolutionary manner. 
Elite behaviour tends to be dominated by predation rather than economic rationality. This 
is contrary to the behavioural assumptions of neo-classical theory. In such circumstances, 
the only way for beneficent social change and sustainable economic development to occur 
is through the intervention of human agency. This could be through the activities of a 
small, enlightened domestic elite or even an individual leader of great prestige, or the 
aegis of an external agency. Such an intervention can break the low level institutional trap 
that most developing countries are stuck in, and through a non-evolutionary, 
discontinuous process, bring about the establishment of superior institutions which 
encourage more rational behaviour over time. This interaction between institutions and 
behaviour can become self-enforcing, as the case studies of Japan, Turkey, India and 
Botswana have shown. The detailed account of deep institutional interventions 
undertaken in Southern Sudan by an external force in cooperation with local elites since 
2005, suggests that this is a useful and successful model for development policy and 
practice. 
 
In a broader intellectual context, the model of social and behavioural change elaborated 
above is much more consistent with our present understanding of the evolution of life and 
the emergence of new species over geological time, rather than the outdated mechanistic 
model borrowed by neo-classical economic theory from 18
th century physics. Let us 
consider this issue further. The traditional historical view of west European economic 
development, and one that is implicit in the new institutional economics literature, is that 
society progresses in a gradual, evolutionary manner. Underlying this view is the 
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Darwinian ([1859] 1996) theory of natural selection which states that evolution works 
through a gradual process of mutation, recombination and selection, with new species 
arising from the slow and steady transformation of entire populations. Palaeontological 
and other discoveries since the writings of Darwin however, have suggested that this view 
does not entirely fit the facts. The emergence and extinction of species rather than being 
gradual has been found to be episodic and discontinuous. About 530 million years ago we 
have the Cambrian explosion, when organisms evolved beyond their individual cell 
structures and there was a great outburst of complex life forms (Gould, 1989; Butterfield, 
2007). Subsequent to this, there have been several major, episodic extinctions. These 
include the Ordovician, 440 million years ago; the Devonian, 365 million years ago; the 
Permian, 250 million years ago; the Triassic, 210 million years ago; and the Cretaceous, 
65 million years ago. During the Permian extinction, it is estimated that almost 95% of all 
species vanished (Erwin, 1993), while the Cretaceous extinction resulted in the 
disappearance of 70% of species, including the dinosaurs. 
 
Based on these new discoveries, modern paleontologists (Eldredge and Gould, 1972) 
argue that most species are in a state of homeostatic equilibrium. These homeostatic 
systems or steady states resist change by self-regulation. The history of evolution is 
therefore, not one of stately and gradual unfolding of change, but one of equilibria 
disturbed only rarely by rapid and episodic events which cause fundamental change to the 
nature, diversity and type of life on the planet. Thus for instance, mammals seem to have 
bided their time for millions of years until the dinosaurs perished in the Cretaceous 
extinction. They then burst forth in proliferation, in the subsequent Tertiary period. This 
view of creation and destruction is much more consistent with the available fossil record, 
which has shown itself to have significant breaks, with discontinuities being a commonly 
observed fact. The presence of such major discontinuities suggests that the process of 
evolutionary change is dominated by episodic phenomena rather gradual transformation. 
For instance, we now have significant geological evidence to suggest that the KT event 65 
million years ago, which brought about the Cretaceous extinction, was actually caused by 
a large asteroid or comet hitting the earth (Alvarez, Alvarez, Asaro and Michel, 1980). 
Exogenous variables such as asteroids, volcanic activity, and glaciation (or the reverse, 
e.g. the melting of what has been termed snowball earth prior to the Cambrian explosion), 
which cause major changes in environmental, climatic or geological conditions therefore, 
seem to be the key factors which bring about the extinction of old species and the 
emergence of new ones. 
 
Transferring this model from natural history into the realm of socio-economic change, we 
find many parallels with the major propositions of our theory. Firstly, although in the very 
long run society is in a continuous state of transition and transformation, during any given 
historical period it is likely to be in some sort of self-regulating equilibrium. As modern 
economic theory has shown, this equilibrium will be determined by the history, balance of 
social forces, distribution of wealth, etc. in that society, and is more likely than not to be a 
low-level equilibrium trap. Secondly, to change this steady state, an exogenous 
intervention is required. We have argued that in the case of the non-western world, this 
exogenous intervention has been in the form of human agency: either domestic, external, 
or a combination of the two. This exogenous intervention by changing the socio-
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economic environment facing a society, or in other words its institutional framework, 
facilitates the emergence and dominance of certain types of groups and certain types of 
behaviour. While such groups or behaviour may have been present in these societies in 
the earlier periods, their existence would only have been in an embryonic form because of 
the dominance of predatory groups. This view of the role of human agency as being the 
essential factor in bringing about institutional change is similar to the geological view of 
the impact of the KT event at the end of the Cretaceous period on the evolution of life on 
our planet. This event brought about a fundamental change in the natural environment, 
causing the extinction of the then dominant species, including the dinosaurs, and 
permitted the proliferation of other species, such as mammals, a process which eventually 
led to the emergence of man. To allow the progression and development of mammalian 
species, the dominant predators had to be destroyed through an exogenous event. This is 
quite similar to our argument about the necessity for more efficient economic and social 
institutions to be introduced and established, so that predation can be controlled, more 
rational levels of human behaviour encouraged, and higher levels of economic progress 
achieved. 
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